Communication for Public Goods

This paper studies information transmission between multiple agents with di¤erent preferences and a welfare maximizing decision maker who chooses the quality or quantity of a public good (e.g. provision of public health service; carbon emissions policy; pace of lectures in a classroom) that is consumed by all of them. Communication in such circumstances suffers from the agents' incentive to "exaggerate" their preferences relative to the average of the other agents, since the decision maker's reaction to each agent's message is weaker than in one-to-one communication. As the number of agents becomes larger the quality of information transmission diminishes. The use of binary messages (e.g. "yes" or "no") is shown to be a robust mode of communication when the main source of informational distortion is exaggeration.

Confidence and Competence in Communication

This paper studies information transmission between an uninformed decision maker (receiver) and an informed player (sender) who have asymmetric beliefs ("con fidence") on the sender s ability ("competence") to observe the state of nature. We fi nd that even when the material payoffs of are perfectly aligned, the sender s over- and underconfi dence on his information give rise to information loss in communication, although they do not by themselves completely eliminate information transmission in equilibrium. However, an underconfi dent sender may prefer no communication to informative communication. We also show that when the sender is biased, overconfi dence can lead to more information transmission and welfare improvement.

Out of sight, out of mind? Educational outcomes of children with parents working abroad.

Impact of parental emigration on educational outcomes of children is theoretically ambiguous. Using novel data I collected on migration experience and its timing, family background and school performance of lower secondary pupils in Poland, I analyse the question empirically. Migration is mostly temporary in nature, with one parent engaging in employment abroad. As many as 63% of migrant parents have vocational qualifications, 29% graduated from high school, 4% have no qualifications and the remaining 4% graduated from university. Almost 18% of children are affected by parental migration. Perhaps surprisingly, estimates suggest that parental employment abroad has a positive immediate impact on a pupil’s grade. Parental education appears pivotal; children of high school graduates benefit most. Longer term effects appear more negative, however, suggesting that a prolonged migration significantly lowers a child’s grade. Interestingly, siblings’ foreign experiences exert a large, positive impact on pupils’ grades.

Educational spillovers and parental migration

Impacts of parental emigration on educational outcomes of children and, in turn, the children’s influence on peers are theoretically ambiguous. Using novel data I collected on migration experiences and timing, family background and school performance of lower secondary pupils in Poland, I analyse empirically whether children with parents working abroad (PWA) influence school performance of their classmates. Migration is mostly temporary in nature, with one parent engaging in employment abroad. As many as 63% of migrant parents have vocational qualifications, 29% graduated from high school, 4% have no qualifications and the remaining 4% graduated from university. Almost 18% of all children are affected by parental migration and, on average, 6.5% of pupils in a class have a parent abroad. Perhaps surprisingly, estimates suggest that pupils benefit from the presence of PWA classmates. PWA pupils whose parents graduated from high school exert the biggest positive impact on their classroom peers. Further, classmates are differently affected by PWA children; those who themselves experienced migration within the family benefit most. This positive effect is likely driven by the student level interactions or increased teachers’ commitment to classes with students from migrant families.