A Salience Theory of Choice Errors

We study a psychologically based foundation for choice errors. The decision maker applies a preference ranking after forming a 'consideration set' prior to choosing an alternative. Membership of the consideration set is determined both by the alternative specific salience and by the rationality of the agent (his general propensity to consider all alternatives). The model turns out to include a logit formulation as a special case. In general, it has a rich set of implications both for exogenous parameters and for a situation in which alternatives can a¤ect their own salience (salience games). Such implications are relevant to assess the link between 'revealed' preferences and 'true' preferences: for example, less rational agents may paradoxically express their preference through choice more truthfully than more rational agents.

Currency Forecast Errors at Times of Low Interest Rates: Evidence from Survey Data on the Yen/Dollar Exchange Rate

Using survey expectations data and Markov-switching models, this paper evaluates the characteristics and evolution of investors' forecast errors about the yen/dollar exchange rate. Since our model is derived from the uncovered interest rate parity (UIRP) condition and our data cover a period of low interest rates, this study is also related to the forward premium puzzle and the currency carry trade strategy. We obtain the following results. First, with the same forecast horizon, exchange rate forecasts are homogeneous among different industry types, but within the same industry, exchange rate forecasts differ if the forecast time horizon is different. In particular, investors tend to undervalue the future exchange rate for long term forecast horizons; however, in the short run they tend to overvalue the future exchange rate. Second, while forecast errors are found to be partly driven by interest rate spreads, evidence against the UIRP is provided regardless of the forecasting time horizon; the forward premium puzzle becomes more significant in shorter term forecasting errors. Consistent with this finding, our coefficients on interest rate spreads provide indirect evidence of the yen carry trade over only a short term forecast horizon. Furthermore, the carry trade seems to be active when there is a clear indication that the interest rate will be low in the future.

Decision Errors, Legal Uncertainty and Welfare: a General Treatment

This paper provides a general treatment of the implications for welfare of legal uncertainty. We distinguish legal uncertainty from decision errors: though the former can be influenced by the latter, the latter are neither necessary nor sufficient for the existence of legal uncertainty. We show that an increase in decision errors will always reduce welfare. However, for any given level of decision errors, information structures involving more legal uncertainty can improve welfare. This holds always, even when there is complete legal uncertainty, when sanctions on socially harmful actions are set at their optimal level. This transforms radically one’s perception about the “costs” of legal uncertainty. We also provide general proofs for two results, previously established under restrictive assumptions. The first is that Effects-Based enforcement procedures may welfare dominate Per Se (or object-based) procedures and will always do so when sanctions are optimally set. The second is that optimal sanctions may well be higher under enforcement procedures involving more legal uncertainty.

Optimal Universal and Categorical Benefits with Classification Errors and Imperfect Enforcement

We determine he optimal combination of a universal benefit, B, and categorical benefit, C, for an economy in which individuals differ in both their ability to work - modelled as an exogenous zero quantity constraint on labour supply - and, conditional on being able to work, their productivity at work. C is targeted at those unable to work, and is conditioned in two dimensions: ex-ante an individual must be unable to work and be awarded the benefit, whilst ex-post a recipient must not subsequently work. However, the ex-ante conditionality may be imperfectly enforced due to Type I (false rejection) and Type II (false award) classification errors, whilst, in addition, the ex-post conditionality may be imperfectly enforced. If there are no classification errors - and thus no enforcement issues - it is always optimal to set C>0, whilst B=0 only if the benefit budget is sufficiently small. However, when classification errors occur, B=0 only if there are no Type I errors and the benefit budget is sufficiently small, while the conditions under which C>0 depend on the enforcement of the ex-post conditionality. We consider two discrete alternatives. Under No Enforcement C>0 only if the test administering C has some discriminatory power. In addition, social welfare is decreasing in the propensity to make each type error. However, under Full Enforcement C>0 for all levels of discriminatory power. Furthermore, whilst social welfare is decreasing in the propensity to make Type I errors, there are certain conditions under which it is increasing in the propensity to make Type II errors. This implies that there may be conditions under which it would be welfare enhancing to lower the chosen eligibility threshold - support the suggestion by Goodin (1985) to "err on the side of kindness".

Type II Errors in IO Multipliers

This paper compares methods for calculating Input-Output (IO) Type II multipliers. These are formulations of the standard Leontief IO model which endogenise elements of household consumption. An analytical comparison of the two basic IO Type II multiplier methods with the Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) multiplier approach identifies the treatment of non-wage income generated in production as a central problem. The multiplier values for each of the IO and SAM methods are calculated using Scottish data for 2009. These results can be used to choose which Type II IO multiplier to adopt where SAM multiplier values are unavailable.