Threshold Effects of Dismissal Protection Regulation and the Emergence of Temporary Work Agencies

Labour market regulations aimed at enhancing job-security are dominant in several OECD countries. These regulations seek to reduce dismissals of workers and fluctuations in employment. The main theoretical contribution is to gauge the effects of such regulations on labour demand across establishment sizes. In order to achieve this, we investigate an optimising model of labour demand under uncertainty through the application of real option theory. We also consider other forms of employment which increase the flexibility of the labour market. In particular, we are modelling the contribution of temporary employment agencies (Zeitarbeit) allowing for quick personnel adjustments in client firms. The calibration results indicate that labour market rigidities may be crucial for understanding sluggishness in firms´ labour demand and the emergence and growth of temporary work.

Do institutions matter for economic fluctuations? Weak property rights in a business cycle model for Mexico

This paper shows that introducing weak property rights in the standard real business cycle (RBC) model can help to explain economic fluctuations. This is motivated by the empirical observation that changes in institutions in emerging markets are related to the evolution of the main macroeconomic variables. In particular, in Mexico, the movements in productivity in the data are associated with changes in institutions, so that we can explain productivity shocks to a large extent as shocks to the quality of institutions. We find that the model with shocks to the degree of protection of property rights only - without technology shocks - can match the second moments in the data for Mexico well. In particular, the fit is better than that of the standard neoclassical model with full protection of property rights regarding the auto-correlations and cross-correlations in the data, especially those related to labor. Viewing productivity shocks as shocks to institutions is also consistent with the stylized fact of falling productivity and non-decreasing labor hours in Mexico over 1980-1994, which is a feature that the neoclassical model cannot match.

The Role of Institutions in Cross-Section Income and Panel Data Growth Models: A Deeper Investigation on the Weakness and Proliferation of Instruments

This paper investigates the role of institutions in determining per capita income levels and growth. It contributes to the empirical literature by using different variables as proxies for institutions and by developing a deeper analysis of the issues arising from the use of weak and too many instruments in per capita income and growth regressions. The cross-section estimation suggests that institutions seem to matter, regardless if they are the only explanatory variable or are combined with geographical and integration variables, although most models suffer from the issue of weak instruments. The results from the growth models provides some interesting results: there is mixed evidence on the role of institutions and such evidence is more likely to be associated with law and order and investment profile; government spending is an important policy variable; collapsing the number of instruments results in fewer significant coefficients for institutions.

A Nonlinear Panel Unit Root Test under Cross Section Dependence

We propose a nonlinear heterogeneous panel unit root test for testing the null hypothesis of unit-roots processes against the alternative that allows a proportion of units to be generated by globally stationary ESTAR processes and a remaining non-zero proportion to be generated by unit root processes. The proposed test is simple to implement and accommodates cross sectional dependence. We show that the distribution of the test statistic is free of nuisance parameters as (N, T) −! 1. Monte Carlo simulation shows that our test holds correct size and under the hypothesis that data are generated by globally stationary ESTAR processes has a better power than the recent test proposed in Pesaran [2007]. Various applications are provided.

Corruption and Financial Intermediation in a Panel of Regions: Cross-Border Effects of Corruption

The importance of financial market reforms in combating corruption has been highlighted in the theoretical literature but has not been systemically tested empirically. In this study we provide a first pass at testing this relationship using both linear and nonmonotonic forms of the relationship between corruption and financial intermediation. Our study finds a negative and statistically significant impact of financial intermediation on corruption. Specifically, the results imply that a one standard deviation increase in financial intermediation is associated with a decrease in corruption of 0.20 points, or 16 percent of the standard deviation in the corruption index and this relationship is shown to be robust to a variety of specification changes, including: (i) different sets of control variables; (ii) different econometrics techniques; (iii) different sample sizes; (iv) alternative corruption indices; (v) removal of outliers; (vi) different sets of panels; and (vii) allowing for cross country interdependence, contagion effects, of corruption.

Employment Protection, Flexibility and Firms’ Strategic Location Decisions under Uncertainty

We construct a model in which oligopolistic firms decide between locating in a country where employment protection implies costly output adjustments and in one without employment protection. Using a two-period three-stage game with uncertainty, we demonstrate that location is influenced by both flexibility and strategic concerns. The strategic effects under Cournot work towards domestic anchorage in the country with employment protection while those under Bertrand do not. Strategic agglomeration can occur in the inflexible country under Cournot and even under Bertrand, provided uncertainty and foreign direct investment costs are low.