Price Transmission and Effects of Exchange Rates on Domestic Commodity Prices via Offshore and Currency Hedging

The framework presents how trading in the foreign commodity futures market and the forward exchange market can affect the optimal spot positions of domestic commodity producers and traders. It generalizes the models of Kawai and Zilcha (1986) and Kofman and Viaene (1991) to allow both intermediate and final commodities to be traded in the international and futures markets, and the exporters/importers to face production shock, domestic factor costs and a random price. Applying mean-variance expected utility, we find that a rise in the expected exchange rate can raise both supply and demand for commodities and reduce domestic prices if the exchange rate elasticity of supply is greater than that of demand. Whether higher volatilities of exchange rate and foreign futures price can reduce the optimal spot position of domestic traders depends on the correlation between the exchange rate and the foreign futures price. Even though the forward exchange market is unbiased, and there is no correlation between commodity prices and exchange rates, the exchange rate can still affect domestic trading and prices through offshore hedging and international trade if the traders are interested in their profit in domestic currency. It illustrates how the world prices and foreign futures prices of commodities and their volatility can be transmitted to the domestic market as well as the dynamic relationship between intermediate and final goods prices. The equilibrium prices depends on trader behaviour i.e. who trades or does not trade in the foreign commodity futures and domestic forward currency markets. The empirical result applying a two-stage-least-squares approach to Thai rice and rubber prices supports the theoretical result.

Primary Commodity Prices: Co-movements, Common Factors and Fundamentals

The behavior of commodities is critical for developing and developed countries alike. This paper contributes to the empirical evidence on the co-movement and determinants of commodity prices. Using nonstationary panel methods, we document a statistically significant degree of co-movement due to a common factor. Within a Factor Augmented VAR approach, real interest rate and uncertainty, as postulated by a simple asset pricing model, are both found to be negatively related to this common factor. This evidence is robust to the inclusion of demand and supply shocks, which both positively impact on the co-movement of commodity prices.

The Rebound Effect with Energy Production: A Partial Equilibrium Analysis

Rebound is the extent to which improvements in energy efficiency fail to translate fully into reductions in energy use because of the implicit fall in the price of energy, when measured in efficiency units. This paper discusses aspects of the rebound effect that are introduced once energy is considered as a domestically produced commodity. A partial equilibrium approach is adopted in order to incorporate both energy use and production in a conceptually tractable way. The paper explores analytically two interesting results revealed in previous numerical simulations. The first is the possibility that energy use could fall by more than the implied improvement in efficiency. This corresponds to negative rebound. The second is the finding that the short-run rebound value can be greater than the corresponding long-run value.

The effects of entry in thin markets

We consider entry of additional firms into the market for a single commodity in which both sellers and buyers are permitted to interact strategically. We show that the market is quasi-competitive, in that the inclusion of an additional seller lowers the price and increases the volume of trade, as expected. However, whilst buyers benefit from this change under reasonable conditions on preferences, we cannot conclude that sellers are always made worse off in the face of more intense competition, contrary to the conventional wisdom. We characterize the conditions under which entry by new sellers may raise the equilibrium profit of existing sellers, which will depend in an intuitive way on the elasticity of a strategic analog of demand and the market share of existing sellers, and encompass completely standard economic environments.

International Capital Flows to Emerging and Developing Countries: National and Global Determinants

This paper examines international capital flows to emerging and developing countries. We assess whether commonalities exist, the permanence of shocks to commonalities and their determinants. Also, we consider individual country coherence with global capital flows and we measure the extent of co-movements in the volatility of capital flows. Our results suggest there are commonalities in capital inflows, although aggregate or disaggregate capital flows respond differently to shocks. We find that the US long run real interest rate is an important determinant of global capital flows, and real commodity prices are relevant but to a lesser extent. We also find a role for human capital in explaining why some countries can successfully ride the wave of financial globalisation.

Revealed cardinal preference

I prove that as long as we allow the marginal utility for money (lambda) to vary between purchases (similarly to the budget) then the quasi-linear and the ordinal budget-constrained models rationalize the same data. However, we know that lambda is approximately constant. I provide a simple constructive proof for the necessary and sufficient condition for the constant lambda rationalization, which I argue should replace the Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preference in empirical studies of consumer behavior. 'Go Cardinals!' It is the minimal requirement of any scientifi c theory that it is consistent with the data it is trying to explain. In the case of (Hicksian) consumer theory it was revealed preference -introduced by Samuelson (1938,1948) - that provided an empirical test to satisfy this need. At that time most of economic reasoning was done in terms of a competitive general equilibrium, a concept abstract enough so that it can be built on the ordinal preferences over baskets of goods - even if the extremely specialized ones of Arrow and Debreu. However, starting in the sixties, economics has moved beyond the 'invisible hand' explanation of how -even competitive- markets operate. A seemingly unavoidable step of this 'revolution' was that ever since, most economic research has been carried out in a partial equilibrium context. Now, the partial equilibrium approach does not mean that the rest of the markets are ignored, rather that they are held constant. In other words, there is a special commodity -call it money - that reflects the trade-offs of moving purchasing power across markets. As a result, the basic building block of consumer behavior in partial equilibrium is no longer the consumer's preferences over goods, rather her valuation of them, in terms of money. This new paradigm necessitates a new theory of revealed preference.

An issue with own-rates: Keynes borrows from Sraffa , Sraffa criticises Keynes, and present-day commentators get hold of the wrong end of the stick

Scholars who in recent years have studied the Sraffa papers held in the Wren Library of Trinity College, Cambridge, have concluded from Sraffa’s critical (but unpublished) observations on Chapter 17 of Keynes’s General Theory that he rejected Keynes’s central proposition that the rate of interest on money may come to ‘rule the roost’, thus dragging the economy into recession. While Sraffa does indeed express dissatisfaction with Chapter 17, the commentators have, we believe, misunderstood his concern: we suggest that he was unhappy with the ‘own-rates’ terminology employed by Keynes rather than with the substance of the theory developed in Chapter 17.

Contracting over Prices

We defi ne a solution concept, perfectly contracted equilibrium, for an intertemporal exchange economy where agents are simultaneously price takers in spot commodity markets while engaging in non-Walrasian contracting over future prices. In a setting with subjective uncertainty over future prices, we show that perfectly contracted equi- librium outcomes are a subset of Pareto optimal allocations. It is a robust possibility for perfectly contracted equilibrium outcomes to di er from Arrow-Debreu equilibrium outcomes. We show that both centralized banking and retrading with bilateral contracting can lead to perfectly contracted equilibria.

A Simple Characterization of Dynamic Completeness in Continuous Time

This paper investigates dynamic completeness of financial markets in which the underlying risk process is a multi-dimensional Brownian motion and the risky securities dividends geometric Brownian motions. A sufficient condition, that the instantaneous dispersion matrix of the relative dividends is non-degenerate, was established recently in the literature for single-commodity, pure-exchange economies with many heterogenous agents, under the assumption that the intermediate flows of all dividends, utilities, and endowments are analytic functions. For the current setting, a different mathematical argument in which analyticity is not needed shows that a slightly weaker condition suffices for general pricing kernels. That is, dynamic completeness obtains irrespectively of preferences, endowments, and other structural elements (such as whether or not the budget constraints include only pure exchange, whether or not the time horizon is finite with lump-sum dividends available on the terminal date, etc.)

Atomic Cournotian Traders May Be Walrasian.

In a bilateral oligopoly, with large traders, represented as atoms, and small traders, represented by an atomless part, when is there a non-empty intersection between the sets of Walras and Cournot-Nash allocations? Using a two commodity version of the Shapley window model, we show that a necessary and sufficient condition for a Cournot- Nash allocation to be a Walras allocation is that all atoms demand a null amount of one of the two commodities. We provide two examples which show that this characterization holds non-vacuously. When our condition fails to hold, we also confirm, through some examples, the result obtained by Okuno, Postlewaite, and Roberts (1980): small traders always have a negligible influence on prices, while the large traders keep their strategic power even when their behavior turns out to be Walrasian in the cooperative framework considered by Gabszewicz and Mertens (1971) and Shitovitz (1973).