Picking the Right Budget Constraint for Scotland

This position paper considers the devolution of further fiscal powers to the Scottish Parliament in the context of the objectives and remit of the Smith Commission. The argument builds on our discussion of fiscal decentralization made in our previous published work on this topic. We ask what sort of budget constraint the Scottish Parliament should operate with. A soft budget constraint (SBC) allows the Scottish Parliament to spend without having to consider all of the tax and, therefore, political consequences, of that spending, which is effectively the position at the moment. The incentives to promote economic growth through fiscal policy – on both the tax and spending sides are weak to non-existent. This is what the Scotland Act, 1998, and the continuing use of the Barnett block grant, gave Scotland. Now other budget constraints are being discussed – those of the Calman Commission (2009) and the Scotland Act (2012), as well as the ones offered in 2014 by the various political parties – Scottish Conservatives, Scottish Greens, Scottish Labour, the Scottish Liberal Democrats and the Scottish Government. There is also the budget constraint designed by the Holtham Commission (2010) for Wales that could just as well be used in Scotland. We examine to what extent these offer the hard budget constraint (HBC) that would bring tax policy firmly into the realm of Scottish politics, asking the Scottish electorate and Parliament to consider the costs to them of increasing spending in terms of higher taxes; or the benefits to them of using public spending to grow the tax base and own-sourced taxes? The hardest budget constraint of all is offered by independence but, as is now known, a clear majority of those who voted in the referendum did not vote for this form of budget constraint. Rather they voted for a significant further devolution of fiscal powers while remaining within a political and monetary union with the rest of the UK, with the risk pooling and revenue sharing that this implies. It is not surprising therefore that none of the budget constraints on offer, apart from the SNP’s, come close to the HBC of independence. However, the almost 25% fall in the price of oil since the referendum, a resource stream so central to the SNP’s economic policy making, underscores why there is a need for a trade off between a HBC and risk pooling and revenue sharing. Ranked according to the desirable characteristic of offering something approaching a HBC the least desirable are those of the Calman Commission, the Scotland Act, 2012, and Scottish Labour. In all of these the ‘elasticity’ of the block grant in the face of failure to grow the Scottish tax base is either not defined or is very elastic – meaning that the risk of failure is shuffled off to taxpayers outside of Scotland. The degree of HBC in the Scottish Conservative, Scottish Greens and Scottish Liberal Democrats proposals are much more desirable from an economic growth point of view, the latter even embracing the HBC proposed by the Holtham Commission that combines serious tax policy with welfare support in the long-run. We judge that the budget constraint in the SNP’s proposals is too hard as it does not allow for continuation of the ‘welfare union’ in the UK. We also consider that in the case of a generalized UK economic slow requiring a fiscal stimulus that the Scottish Parliament be allowed increased borrowing to be repaid in the next economic upturn.

“Policy Scepticism” and the Impact of Scottish Higher Education Institutions (HEIs) on their Host Region: Accounting for Regional Budget Constraints under Devolution

A “policy scepticism” has emerged that challenges the results of conventional regional HEI impact analyses. Its denial of the importance of the expenditure impacts of HEIs appears to be based on a belief in either a binding regional resource constraint or a regional public sector budget constraint. In this paper we provide a systematic critique of this policy scepticism. However, while rejecting the extreme form of policy scepticism, we argue that it is crucial to recognise the importance of the public-sector expenditure constraints that are binding under devolution. We show how conventional impact analyses can be augmented to accommodate regional public sector budget constraints. While our results suggest that conventional impact studies overestimate the expenditure impacts of HEIs, they also demonstrate that the policy scepticism that treats these expenditure effects as irrelevant neglects some key aspects of HEIs, in particular their export intensity.

“Policy Scepticism” and the Impact of Welsh Higher Education Institutions (HEIs) on their Host Region: Accounting for Regional Budget Constraints

This paper replicates the analysis of Scottish HEIs in Hermannsson et al (2010b) for the case of Wales in order to provide a self-contained analysis that is readily accessible by those whose primary concern is with the regional impacts of Welsh HEIs. A “policy scepticism” has emerged that challenges the results of conventional regional HEI impact analyses. This denial of the importance of the expenditure impacts of HEIs appears to be based on a belief in either a binding regional resource constraint or a regional public sector budget constraint. In this paper we provide a systematic critique of this policy scepticism. However, while rejecting the extreme form of policy scepticism, we argue that it is crucial to recognise the importance of the publicsector expenditure constraints that are binding under devolution. We show how conventional impact analyses can be augmented to accommodate regional public sector budget constraints. While our results suggest that conventional impact studies overestimate the expenditure impacts of HEIs, they also demonstrate that the policy scepticism that treats these expenditure effects as irrelevant neglects some key aspects of HEIs, in particular their export intensity.

“Policy Scepticism” and the Impact of Northern Irish Higher Education Institutions (HEIs) on their Host Region: Accounting for Regional Budget Constraints

This paper replicates the analysis of Scottish HEIs in Hermannsson et al (2010b) for the case of Northern Ireland. The motivation is to provide a self-contained analysis that is readily accessible by those whose primary concern is with the regional impacts of Northern Irish HEIs. A comparative analysis will follow in due course. A “policy scepticism” has emerged that challenges the results of conventional regional HEI impact analyses. This denial of the importance of the expenditure impacts of HEIs appears to be based on a belief in either a binding regional resource constraint or a regional public sector budget constraint. In this paper we provide a systematic critique of this policy scepticism. However, while rejecting the extreme form of policy scepticism, we argue that it is crucial to recognise the importance of the public sector expenditure constraints that are binding under devolution. We show how conventional impact analyses can be augmented to accommodate regional public sector budget constraints. While our results suggest that conventional impact studies overestimate the expenditure impacts of HEIs, they also demonstrate that the policy scepticism that treats these expenditure effects as irrelevant neglects some key aspects of HEIs, in particular their export intensity.

The Expenditure Impacts of Individual Higher Education Institutions (HEIs) and their Students on the Scottish Economy under Devolution: Homogeneity or Heterogeneity?

Comparing each of the twenty Higher Education Institutions (HEIs) in Scotland as separate sectors in an Input-Output table suggests their expenditure patterns are homogenous and that the apparent heterogeneity of their impacts is primarily driven by scale. However, a disaggregation of their income by source reveals a disparity in their dependence upon funding from the devolved Scottish Government and their ability to draw in income/funding from external sources. Acknowledging the binding budget constraint of the Scottish Government and deriving balanced expenditure multipliers reveals large differences in the net-expenditure impact of HEIs upon the Scottish economy, with the source of variation being the origin of income. Applying a novel treatment of student expenditure impacts, identifying the amount of exogenous spending per student, modifies the heterogeneity of the overall expenditure impacts. On balance this suggests that the impacts of impending budget cut-backs will be quite different by institution depending on their sensitivity to public funding. However, predicting the outcome of budget cutbacks at the margin is problematic as we do not know whether public and external incomes are complements or substitutions (and indeed this may vary between individual HEIs).

The Expenditure Impacts of Individual Higher Education Institutions (HEIs) and their Students on the Welsh Economy: Homogeneity or Heterogeneity?

This paper replicates the analysis of Scottish HEIs in Hermannsson et al (2010a) for the case of Wales in order to provide a self-contained analysis that is readily accessible by those whose primary concern is with the regional impacts of Welsh HEIs. When we treat each of the twelve Higher Education Institutions (HEIs) that existed in Wales in 2006 as separate sectors in conventional input-output analysis, their expenditure impacts per unit of final demand appear rather homogenous, with the apparent heterogeneity of their overall impacts being primarily driven by scale. However, a disaggregation of their income by source reveals considerable variation in their dependence upon funding from the devolved Welsh Assembly Government and their ability to draw in income/funding from external sources. Acknowledging the binding budget constraint of the Welsh Assembly Government and deriving balanced expenditure multipliers reveals large differences in the net-expenditure impact of HEIs upon the Welsh economy, with the source of variation being the origin of income. Applying a novel treatment of student expenditure impacts, identifying the amount of exogenous spending per student, modifies the heterogeneity of the overall expenditure impacts. On balance this suggests that the impacts of impending budget cut-backs will be quite different by institution depending on their sensitivity to public funding. However, predicting the outcome of budget cutbacks at the margin is problematic for reasons that we identify.

“Policy Scepticism” and the Impact of London-based Higher Education Institutions (HEIs) on the economy of England: Accounting for Alternative Uses of Public Expenditure

This paper replicates the analysis of Scottish HEIs in Hermannsson et al (2010a) for the case of London-based HEIs’ impact on the English economy in order to provide a self-contained analysis that is readily accessible by those whose primary concern is with the regional impacts of London HEIs. A “policy scepticism” has emerged that challenges the results of conventional regional HEI impact analyses. This denial of the importance of the expenditure impacts of HEIs appears to be based on a belief in either a binding regional resource constraint or a regional public sector budget constraint. In this paper we provide a systematic critique of this policy scepticism. However, while rejecting the extreme form of policy scepticism, we argue that it is crucial to recognise the importance of alternative uses of public expenditure, and show how conventional impact analyses can be augmented to accommodate this. While our results suggest that conventional impact studies overestimate the expenditure impacts of HEIs, they also demonstrate that the policy scepticism that treats these expenditure effects as irrelevant neglects some key aspects of HEIs, in particular their export intensity.

The Expenditure Impacts of London-based Individual Higher Education Institutions (HEIs) and their Students on the Economy of England: Homogeneity or Heterogeneity?

This paper replicates the analysis of Scottish HEIs in Hermannsson et al (2010a) to identify the impact of London-based HEIs on the English economy in order to provide a self-contained analysis that is readily accessible by those whose primary concern is with the regional impacts of London HEIs. When we treat each of the 38 London-based Higher Education Institutions (HEIs) that existed in England in 2006 as separate sectors in conventional input-output analysis, their expenditure impacts per unit of final demand appear rather homogenous (though less so than HEIs in Wales and Scotland), with the apparent heterogeneity of their overall impacts being primarily driven by scale. However, a disaggregation of their income by source reveals considerable variation in their dependence upon general public funding and their ability to draw in income/funding from external sources. Acknowledging the possible alternative uses of the public funding and deriving balanced expenditure multipliers reveals large differences in the net-expenditure impact of London HEIs upon the English economy, with the source of variation being the origin of income. Applying a novel treatment of student expenditure impacts, identifying the amount of exogenous spending per student, modifies the heterogeneity of the overall expenditure impacts. On balance this suggests that the impacts of impending budget cut-backs will be quite different by institution depending on their sensitivity to public funding. However, predicting the outcome of budget cutbacks at the margin is problematic for reasons that we identify.

The Expenditure Impacts of Individual Higher Education Institutions (HEIs) and their Students on the Northern Irish Economy: Homogeneity or Heterogeneity?

This paper replicates the analysis of Scottish HEIs in Hermannsson et al (2010a) for the case of Northern Ireland in order to provide a self-contained analysis that is readily accessible by those whose primary concern is with the regional impacts of Northern-Irish HEIs. When we treat each of the four Higher Education Institutions (HEIs) that existed in Northern Ireland in 2006 as separate sectors in conventional input-output analysis, their expenditure impacts per unit of final demand appear rather homogenous, with the apparent heterogeneity of their overall impacts being primarily driven by scale. However, a disaggregation of their income by source reveals considerable variation in their dependence upon funding from the devolved Assembly and their ability to draw in income/funding from external sources. Acknowledging the binding budget constraint of the Northern Ireland Assembly and deriving balanced expenditure multipliers reveals large differences in the netexpenditure impact of HEIs upon the Northern Irish economy, with the source of variation being the origin of income. Applying a novel treatment of student expenditure impacts, identifying the amount of exogenous spending per student, modifies the heterogeneity of the overall expenditure impacts. On balance this suggests that the impacts of impending budget cut-backs will be quite different by institution depending on their sensitivity to public funding. However, predicting the outcome of budget cutbacks at the margin is problematic for reasons that we identify.

The marginal utility of money: A modern Marshallian approach to consumer choice

We reformulate neoclassical consumer choice by focusing on lambda, the marginal utility of money. As the opportunity cost of current expenditure, lambda is approximated by the slope of the indirect utility function of the continuation. We argue that lambda can largely supplant the role of an arbitrary budget constraint in partial equilibrium analysis. The result is a better grounded, more flexible and more intuitive approach to consumer choice.

Consumption Expenditures in Economic Impact Studies: An Application to University Students

This paper examines how appropriately to attribute economic impact to consumption expenditures. Consumption expenditures are often treated as either wholly endogenous or wholly exogenous, following a distinction from Input-Output analysis. For many applications, such as those focusing on the impacts of tourism or benefits systems, such binomial assumptions are not satisfactory. We argue that consumption is neither wholly endogenous nor wholly exogenous but that the degree of this distinction is rather an empirical matter. We set out a general model for the treatment of consumption expenditures and illustrate its application through the case of university students. We examine individual student groups and how the impacts of students at particular institutions. Furthermore we take into account the binding budget constraint of public expenditures (as is the case for devolved regions in the UK)and examine how this affects the impact attributed to students' consumption expenditures.

Balanced Budget Government Spending in a Small Open Regional Economy

This paper investigates the impact of a balanced budget fiscal policy expansion in a regional context within a numerical dynamic general equilibrium model. We take Scotland as an example where, recently, there has been extensive debate on greater fiscal autonomy. In response to a balanced budget fiscal expansion the model suggests that: an increase in current government purchase in goods and services has negative multiplier effects only if the elasticity of substitution between private and public consumption is high enough to move downward the marginal utility of private consumers; public capital expenditure crowds in consumption and investment even with a high level of congestion; but crowding out effects might arise in the short-run if agents are myopic.

The Budget 2009 Tax Proposals and Activity in the UK Continental Shelf (UKCS)

NORTH SEA STUDY OCCASIONAL PAPER No. 113

The Effects of Budget 2011 on Activity in the UK Continental Shelf

NORTH SEA STUDY OCCASIONAL PAPER No. 120

Optimal Universal and Categorical Benefits with Classification Errors and Imperfect Enforcement

We determine he optimal combination of a universal benefit, B, and categorical benefit, C, for an economy in which individuals differ in both their ability to work - modelled as an exogenous zero quantity constraint on labour supply - and, conditional on being able to work, their productivity at work. C is targeted at those unable to work, and is conditioned in two dimensions: ex-ante an individual must be unable to work and be awarded the benefit, whilst ex-post a recipient must not subsequently work. However, the ex-ante conditionality may be imperfectly enforced due to Type I (false rejection) and Type II (false award) classification errors, whilst, in addition, the ex-post conditionality may be imperfectly enforced. If there are no classification errors - and thus no enforcement issues - it is always optimal to set C>0, whilst B=0 only if the benefit budget is sufficiently small. However, when classification errors occur, B=0 only if there are no Type I errors and the benefit budget is sufficiently small, while the conditions under which C>0 depend on the enforcement of the ex-post conditionality. We consider two discrete alternatives. Under No Enforcement C>0 only if the test administering C has some discriminatory power. In addition, social welfare is decreasing in the propensity to make each type error. However, under Full Enforcement C>0 for all levels of discriminatory power. Furthermore, whilst social welfare is decreasing in the propensity to make Type I errors, there are certain conditions under which it is increasing in the propensity to make Type II errors. This implies that there may be conditions under which it would be welfare enhancing to lower the chosen eligibility threshold - support the suggestion by Goodin (1985) to "err on the side of kindness".