Distributional and Poverty Consequences of Globalization: A Dynamic Comparative Analysis for Developing Countries

This study examines the impact of globalization on cross-country inequality and poverty using a panel data set for 65 developing counties, over the period 1970-2008. With separate modelling for poverty and inequality, explicit control for financial intermediation, and comparative analysis for developing countries, the study attempts to provide a deeper understanding of cross country variations in income inequality and poverty. The major findings of the study are five fold. First, a non-monotonic relationship between income distribution and the level of economic development holds in all samples of countries. Second, both openness to trade and FDI do not have a favourable effect on income distribution in developing countries. Third, high financial liberalization exerts a negative and significant influence on income distribution in developing countries. Fourth, inflation seems to distort income distribution in all sets of countries. Finally, the government emerges as a major player in impacting income distribution in developing countries.

When Do We Learn to Cooperate? The Role of Social Learning in Social Dilemmas

In this paper, I look at the interaction between social learning and cooperative behavior. I model this using a social dilemma game with publicly observed sequential actions and asymmetric information about pay offs. I find that some informed agents in this model act, individually and without collusion, to conceal the privately optimal action. Because the privately optimal action is socially costly the behavior of informed agents can lead to a Pareto improvement in a social dilemma. In my model I show that it is possible to get cooperative behavior if information is restricted to a small but non-zero proportion of the population. Moreover, such cooperative behavior occurs in a finite setting where it is public knowledge which agent will act last. The proportion of cooperative agents within the population can be made arbitrarily close to 1 by increasing the finite number of agents playing the game. Finally, I show that under a broad set of conditions that it is a Pareto improvement on a corner value, in the ex-ante welfare sense, for an interior proportion of the population to be informed.

Corruption and Financial Intermediation in a Panel of Regions: Cross-Border Effects of Corruption

The importance of financial market reforms in combating corruption has been highlighted in the theoretical literature but has not been systemically tested empirically. In this study we provide a first pass at testing this relationship using both linear and nonmonotonic forms of the relationship between corruption and financial intermediation. Our study finds a negative and statistically significant impact of financial intermediation on corruption. Specifically, the results imply that a one standard deviation increase in financial intermediation is associated with a decrease in corruption of 0.20 points, or 16 percent of the standard deviation in the corruption index and this relationship is shown to be robust to a variety of specification changes, including: (i) different sets of control variables; (ii) different econometrics techniques; (iii) different sample sizes; (iv) alternative corruption indices; (v) removal of outliers; (vi) different sets of panels; and (vii) allowing for cross country interdependence, contagion effects, of corruption.

An axiomatization of difference-form contest success functions

This paper presents an axiomatic characterization of difference-form group contests, that is, contests fought among groups and where their probability of victory depends on the difference of their effective efforts. This axiomatization rests on the property of Equalizing Consistency, stating that the difference between winning probabilities in the grand contest and in the smaller contest should be identical across all participants in the smaller contest. This property overcomes some of the drawbacks of the widely-used ratio-form contest success functions. Our characterization shows that the criticisms commonly-held against difference-form contests success functions, such as lack of scale invariance and zero elasticity of augmentation, are unfounded.By clarifying the properties of this family of contest success functions, this axiomatization can help researchers to find the functional form better suited to their application of interest.