Valuing American Derivatives by Least Squares Methods

Least Squares estimators are notoriously known to generate sub-optimal exercise decisions when determining the optimal stopping time. The consequence is that the price of the option is underestimated. We show how variance reduction methods can be implemented to obtain more accurate option prices. We also extend the Longsta¤ and Schwartz (2001) method to price American options under stochastic volatility. These are two important contributions that are particularly relevant for practitioners. Finally, we extend the Glasserman and Yu (2004b) methodology to price Asian options and basket options.

Testing the TASP: An Experimental Investigation of Learning in Games with Unstable Equilibria

We report experiments designed to test between Nash equilibria that are stable and unstable under learning. The “TASP” (Time Average of the Shapley Polygon) gives a precise prediction about what happens when there is divergence from equilibrium under fictitious play like learning processes. We use two 4 x 4 games each with a unique mixed Nash equilibrium; one is stable and one is unstable under learning. Both games are versions of Rock-Paper-Scissors with the addition of a fourth strategy, Dumb. Nash equilibrium places a weight of 1/2 on Dumb in both games, but the TASP places no weight on Dumb when the equilibrium is unstable. We also vary the level of monetary payoffs with higher payoffs predicted to increase instability. We find that the high payoff unstable treatment differs from the others. Frequency of Dumb is lower and play is further from Nash than in the other treatments. That is, we find support for the comparative statics prediction of learning theory, although the frequency of Dumb is substantially greater than zero in the unstable treatments.

Optimal Martingales and American Option Pricing

Pricing American options is an interesting research topic since there is no analytical solution to value these derivatives. Different numerical methods have been proposed in the literature with some, if not all, either limited to a specific payoff or not applicable to multidimensional cases. Applications of Monte Carlo methods to price American options is a relatively new area that started with Longstaff and Schwartz (2001). Since then, few variations of that methodology have been proposed. The general conclusion is that Monte Carlo estimators tend to underestimate the true option price. The present paper follows Glasserman and Yu (2004b) and proposes a novel Monte Carlo approach, based on designing "optimal martingales" to determine stopping times. We show that our martingale approach can also be used to compute the dual as described in Rogers (2002).

Dominance Solvable Games with Multiple Payoff Criteria.

Two logically distinct and permissive extensions of iterative weak dominance are introduced for games with possibly vector-valued payoffs. The first, iterative partial dominance, builds on an easy-to check condition but may lead to solutions that do not include any (generalized) Nash equilibria. However, the second and intuitively more demanding extension, iterative essential dominance, is shown to be an equilibrium refinement. The latter result includes Moulin’s (1979) classic theorem as a special case when all players’ payoffs are real-valued. Therefore, essential dominance solvability can be a useful solution concept for making sharper predictions in multicriteria games that feature a plethora of equilibria.