Intra-Group Competition and Inter-Group Conflict: An Application to Northern Ireland

This paper reviews four economic theories of leadership selection in conflictual settings. The first of these by Cukierman and Tomassi (1998) labeled the ‘information rationale’, argues that hawks may actually be necessary to initiate peace agreements. The second labeled the ‘bargaining rationale’ borrowing from Hamlin and Jennings (2007) agrees with the conventional wisdom that doves are more likely to secure peace, but post-conflict there are good reasons for hawks to be rationally selected. The third found in Jennings and Roelfsema (2008) is labeled the social psychological rationale. This captures the idea of a competition over which group can form the strongest identity, so can apply to group choices which do not impinge upon bargaining power. As in the bargaining rationale, dove selection can be predicted during conflict, but hawk selection post-conflict. Finally, the expressive rationale is discussed which predicts that regardless of the underlying structure of the game (informational, bargaining, psychological) the large group nature of decision-making by making individual decision makers non-decisive in determining the outcome of elections may cause them to make choices based primarily on emotions which may be invariant with the mode of group interaction, be it conflictual or peaceful. Finally, the paper analyses the extent to which the theories can throw light on Northern Ireland electoral history over the last 25 years.

Strong Hysteresis due to Age Effects

Strong hysteresis in the labour market (see Cross, 1995) requires workers to be heterogeneous in terms of the cost of hiring and firing. We show how such heterogeneity arises naturally in labour markets due to differences in workers’ age by showing that both the hiring and the firing thresholds for productivity are age dependent. The presence of strong hysteresis does not for this reason depend on ad-hoc differences in the cost of hiring and firing workers.

An HEI-Disaggregated Input-Output Table for Northern-Ireland

This paper describes how the education sector of an Input-Output table for Northern Ireland is disaggregated to identify a separate sector for each of the four Northern Irish Higher Education Institutions (HEIs). The process draws on accounting and survey data to accurately determine the incomes and expenditures of each institution. In particular we emphasise determining the HEIs incomes source of origin to inform their treatment, as endogenous or exogenous, in subsequent analyses. The HEI-disaggregated Input-Output table provides a useful descriptive snapshot of the Northern Irish economy and the role of HEIs within it for a particular year, 2006. The table can be used to derive multipliers and conduct various impact studies of each institution or the sector as a whole. The table is furthermore useful to calibrate other multisectoral, HEI-disaggregated models of regional economies, including Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) and computable general equilibrium (CGE) models.

Testing the Tunnel Effect: Comparison, Age and Happiness in UK and German Panels

In contrast to previous results combining all ages we find positive effects of comparison income on happiness for the under 45s, and negative effects for those over 45. In the BHPS these coefficients are several times the magnitude of own income effects. In GSOEP they cancel to give no effect of effect of comparison income on life satisfaction in the whole sample, when controlling for fixed effects, and time-in-panel, and with flexible, age-group dummies. The residual age-happiness relationship is hump-shaped in all three countries. Results are consistent with a simple life cycle model of relative income under uncertainty.

Age, Life-satisfaction, and Relative Income – Insights from the UK and Germany

We first confirm previous results with the German Socio-Economic Panel by Layard et al. (2010), and obtain strong negative effects of comparison income. However, when we split the sample by age, we find quite different results for reference income. The effects on lifesatisfaction are positive and significant for those under 45, consistent with Hirschman’s (1973) ‘tunnel effect’, and only negative (and larger than in the full sample) for those over 45, when relative deprivation dominates. Thus for young respondents, reference income’s signalling role, indicating potential future prospects, can outweigh relative deprivation effects. Own-income effects are also larger for the older sample, and of greater magnitude than the comparison income effect. In East Germany the reference income effects are insignificant for all. With data from the British Household Panel Survey, we confirm standard results when encompassing all ages, but reference income loses significance in both age groups, and most surprisingly, even own income becomes insignificant for those over 45, while education has significant negative effects.