Political economics and normative analysis

The approaches and opinions of economists often dominate public policy discussion. Economists have gained this privileged position partly (or perhaps mainly) because of the obvious relevance of their subject matter, but also because of the unified methodology (neo-classical economics) that the vast majority of modern economists bring to their analysis of policy problems and proposed solutions. The idea of Pareto efficiency and its potential trade-off with equity is a central idea that is understood by all economists and this common language provides the economics profession with a powerful voice in public affairs. The purpose of this paper is to review and reflect upon the way in which economists find themselves analysing and providing suggestions for social improvements and how this role has changed over roughly the last 60 years. We focus on the fundamental split in the public economics tradition between those that adhere to public finance and those that adhere to public choice. A pure public finance perspective views failures in society as failures of the market. The solutions are technical, as might be enacted by a benevolent dictator. The pure public choice view accepts (sometimes grudgingly) that markets may fail, but so, it insists, does politics. This signals institutional reforms to constrain the potential for political failure. Certain policy recommendations may be viewed as compatible with both traditions, but other policy proposals will be the opposite of that proposed within the other tradition. In recent years a political economics synthesis emerged. This accepts that institutions are very important and governments require constraints, but that some degree of benevolence on the part of policy makers should not be assumed non-existent. The implications for public policy from this approach are, however, much less clear and perhaps more piecemeal. We also discuss analyses of systematic failure, not so much on the part of markets or politicians, but by voters. Most clearly this could lead to populism and relaxing the idea that voters necessarily choose their interests. The implications for public policy are addressed. Throughout the paper we will relate the discussion to the experience of UK government policy-making.

Union Mediation and Adaptation to Reciprocal Loyalty Arrangements

This study assesses the industrial relations application of the „loyalty-exit-voice‟ proposition. The loyalty concept is linked to reciprocal employer-employee arrangements and examined as a job attribute in a vignette questionnaire distributed to low and medium-skilled employees. The responses provided by employees in three European countries indicate that reciprocal loyalty arrangements, which involve the exchange of higher effort for job security, are one of the most desirable job attributes. This attribute exerts a higher impact on the job evaluations provided by unionised workers, compared to their non-union counterparts. This pattern is robust to a number of methodological considerations. It appears to be an outcome of adaptation to union mediated cooperation. Overall the evidence suggests that the loyalty-job evaluation profiles of unionised workers are receptive to repeated interaction and negative shocks, such as unemployment experience. This is not the case for the non-union workers. Finally, unionised workers appear to „voice‟ a lower job satisfaction, but exhibit low „exit‟ intentions, compared to the non-unionised labour.

Exchange Rate Predictability in a Changing World

An expanding literature articulates the view that Taylor rules are helpful in predicting exchange rates. In a changing world however, Taylor rule parameters may be subject to structural instabilities, for example during the Global Financial Crisis. This paper forecasts exchange rates using such Taylor rules with Time Varying Parameters (TVP) estimated by Bayesian methods. In core out-of-sample results, we improve upon a random walk benchmark for at least half, and for as many as eight out of ten, of the currencies considered. This contrasts with a constant parameter Taylor rule model that yields a more limited improvement upon the benchmark. In further results, Purchasing Power Parity and Uncovered Interest Rate Parity TVP models beat a random walk benchmark, implying our methods have some generality in exchange rate prediction.

On the Sources of Uncertainty in Exchange Rate Predictability

We analyse the role of time-variation in coefficients and other sources of uncertainty in exchange rate forecasting regressions. Our techniques incorporate the notion that the relevant set of predictors and their corresponding weights, change over time. We find that predictive models which allow for sudden rather than smooth, changes in coefficients significantly beat the random walk benchmark in out-of-sample forecasting exercise. Using innovative variance decomposition scheme, we identify uncertainty in coefficients' estimation and uncertainty about the precise degree of coefficients' variability, as the main factors hindering models' forecasting performance. The uncertainty regarding the choice of the predictor is small.

Term Structure Dynamics, Macro-Finance Factors and Model Uncertainty

This paper extends the Nelson-Siegel linear factor model by developing a flexible macro-finance framework for modeling and forecasting the term structure of US interest rates. Our approach is robust to parameter uncertainty and structural change, as we consider instabilities in parameters and volatilities, and our model averaging method allows for investors' model uncertainty over time. Our time-varying parameter Nelson-Siegel Dynamic Model Averaging (NS-DMA) predicts yields better than standard benchmarks and successfully captures plausible time-varying term premia in real time. The proposed model has significant in-sample and out-of-sample predictability for excess bond returns, and the predictability is of economic value.