Non-cooperative incentives to share knowledge in competitive environments

In this paper we study a model where non-cooperative agents may exchange knowledge in a competitive environment. As a potential factor that could induce the knowledge disclosure between humans we consider the timing of the moves of players. We develop a simple model of a multistage game in which there are only three players and competition takes place only within two stages. Players can share their private knowledge with their opponents and the knowledge is modelled as in uencing their marginal cost of e¤ort. We identify two main mechanisms that work towards knowledge disclosure. One of them is that before the actual competition starts, the stronger player of the rst stage of a game may have desire to share his knowledge with the "observer", be- cause this reduces the valuation of the prize of the weaker player of that stage and as a result his e¤ort level and probability of winning in a ght. Another mechanism is that the "observer" may have sometimes desire to share knowledge with the weaker player of the rst stage, because in this way, by increasing his probability of winning in that stage, he decreases the probability of winning of the stronger player. As a result, in the second stage the "observer" may have greater chances to meet the weaker player rather than the stronger one. Keywords: knowledge sharing, strategic knowledge disclosure, multistage contest game, non-cooperative games

Estimating Phillips Curves in Turbulent Times using the ECB’s Survey of Professional Forecasters

This paper uses forecasts from the European Central Bank's Survey of Professional Forecasters to investigate the relationship between inflation and inflation expectations in the euro area. We use theoretical structures based on the New Keynesian and Neoclassical Phillips curves to inform our empirical work. Given the relatively short data span of the Survey of Professional Forecasters and the need to control for many explanatory variables, we use dynamic model averaging in order to ensure a parsimonious econometric speci cation. We use both regression-based and VAR-based methods. We find no support for the backward looking behavior embedded in the Neo-classical Phillips curve. Much more support is found for the forward looking behavior of the New Keynesian Phillips curve, but most of this support is found after the beginning of the financial crisis.