Why is it so Hard to Value Intangibles? Evidence from Investments in High-Technology Start-Ups

The paper uses a range of primary-source empirical evidence to address the question: ‘why is it to hard to value intangible assets?’ The setting is venture capital investment in high technology companies. While the investors are risk specialists and financial experts, the entrepreneurs are more knowledgeable about product innovation. Thus the context lends itself to analysis within a principal-agent framework, in which information asymmetry may give rise to adverse selection, pre-contract, and moral hazard, post-contract. We examine how the investor might attenuate such problems and attach a value to such high-tech investments in what are often merely intangible assets, through expert due diligence, monitoring and control. Qualitative evidence is used to qualify the more clear cut picture provided by a principal-agent approach to a more mixed picture in which the ‘art and science’ of investment appraisal are utilised by both parties alike

Rebound and disinvestment effects in oil consumption and supply resulting from an increase in energy efficiency in the Scottish commercial transport sector

In this paper we use an energy-economy-environment computable general equilibrium (CGE) model of the Scottish economy to examine the impacts of an exogenous increase in energy augmenting technological progress in the domestic commercial Transport sector on the supply and use of energy. We focus our analysis on oil, as the main type of energy input used in commercial transport activity. We find that a 5% increase in energy efficiency in the commercial Transport sector leads to rebound effects in the use of oil-based energy commodities in all time periods, in the target sector and at the economy-wide level. However, our results also suggest that such an efficiency improvement may cause a contraction in capacity in the Scottish oil supply sector. This ‘disinvestment effect’ acts as a constraint on the size of rebound effects. However, the magnitude of rebound effects and presence of the disinvestment effect in the simulations conducted here are sensitive to the specification of key elasticities of substitution in the nested production function for the target sector, particularly the substitutability of energy for non-energy intermediate inputs to production.

Marriage as a Rat Race: Noisy Pre-Marital Investments with Assortative Matching

We study the incentive to invest to improve marriage prospects, in a frictionless marriage market with non-transferable utility. Stochastic returns to investment eliminate the multiplicity of equilibria in models with deterministic returns, and a unique equilibrium exists under reasonable conditions. Equilibrium investment is efficient when the sexes are symmetric. However, when there is any asymmetry, including an unbalanced sex ratio, investments are generically excessive. For example, if there is an excess of boys, then there is parental over-investment in boys and under-investment in girls, and total investment will be excessive.

Transaction Costs and Institutions: Investments in Exchange

This paper proposes a simple model for understanding transaction costs for their composition, size and policy implications. We distinguish between investments in institutions that facilitate exchange and the cost of conducting exchange itself. Institutional quality and market size are determined by the decisions of risk averse agents and conditions are discussed under which the efficient allocation may be decentralized. We highlight a number of differences with models where transaction costs are exogenous, including the implications for taxation and measurement issues.