Short-Run Strategies For Attracting Foreign Direct Investment

This paper empirically investigates the effectiveness and feasibility of two FDI policies, fiscal incentives and deregulation, aimed at improving the attractiveness of a country in the short run. Using disaggregated data on sales by US MNEs’ foreign affiliates in 43 developed and developing countries over the 1982-1994 period, results show that the provision of fiscal incentives or the deregulation of the labour market would exert a positive impact on total FDI. Given the drawbacks frequently associated with the use of incentive packages, economy-wide policies which ease firing procedures and reduce severance payments would certainly be the best policy option. This paper also highlights the different aggregation and omitted variable biases that have affected results of previous studies and provides some support to recent theoretical models of FDI by showing that third country effects and spatial interdependence influence respectively the location of export-platform FDI and vertical FDI.

Short-Run Strategies For Attracting Foreign Direct Investment

This paper empirically investigates the effectiveness and feasibility of two FDI policies, fiscal incentives and deregulation, aimed at improving the attractiveness of a country in the short run. Using disaggregated data on sales by US MNEs’ foreign affiliates in 43 developed and developing countries over the 1982-1994 period, results show that the provision of fiscal incentives or the deregulation of the labour market would exert a positive impact on total FDI. Given the drawbacks frequently associated with the use of incentive packages, economy-wide policies which ease firing procedures and reduce severance payments would certainly be the best policy option. This paper also highlights the different aggregation and omitted variable biases that have affected results of previous studies and provides some support to recent theoretical models of FDI by showing that third country effects and spatial interdependence influence respectively the location of export-platform FDI and vertical FDI.

A Comparison Of Forecasting Procedures For Macroeconomic Series: The Contribution Of Structural Break Models

This paper compares the forecasting performance of different models which have been proposed for forecasting in the presence of structural breaks. These models differ in their treatment of the break process, the parameters defining the model which applies in each regime and the out-of-sample probability of a break occurring. In an extensive empirical evaluation involving many important macroeconomic time series, we demonstrate the presence of structural breaks and their importance for forecasting in the vast majority of cases. However, we find no single forecasting model consistently works best in the presence of structural breaks. In many cases, the formal modeling of the break process is important in achieving good forecast performance. However, there are also many cases where simple, rolling OLS forecasts perform well.

A Comparison Of Forecasting Procedures For Macroeconomic Series: The Contribution Of Structural Break Models

This paper compares the forecasting performance of different models which have been proposed for forecasting in the presence of structural breaks. These models differ in their treatment of the break process, the parameters defining the model which applies in each regime and the out-of-sample probability of a break occurring. In an extensive empirical evaluation involving many important macroeconomic time series, we demonstrate the presence of structural breaks and their importance for forecasting in the vast majority of cases. However, we find no single forecasting model consistently works best in the presence of structural breaks. In many cases, the formal modeling of the break process is important in achieving good forecast performance. However, there are also many cases where simple, rolling OLS forecasts perform well.

Legal Uncertainty, Competition Law Enforcement Procedures and Optimal Penalties

In this paper we make three contributions to the literature on optimal Competition Law enforcement procedures. The first (which is of general interest beyond competition policy) is to clarify the concept of “legal uncertainty”, relating it to ideas in the literature on Law and Economics, but formalising the concept through various information structures which specify the probability that each firm attaches – at the time it takes an action – to the possibility of its being deemed anti-competitive were it to be investigated by a Competition Authority. We show that the existence of Type I and Type II decision errors by competition authorities is neither necessary nor sufficient for the existence of legal uncertainty, and that information structures with legal uncertainty can generate higher welfare than information structures with legal certainty – a result echoing a similar finding obtained in a completely different context and under different assumptions in earlier Law and Economics literature (Kaplow and Shavell, 1992). Our second contribution is to revisit and significantly generalise the analysis in our previous paper, Katsoulacos and Ulph (2009), involving a welfare comparison of Per Se and Effects- Based legal standards. In that analysis we considered just a single information structure under an Effects-Based standard and also penalties were exogenously fixed. Here we allow for (a) different information structures under an Effects-Based standard and (b) endogenous penalties. We obtain two main results: (i) considering all information structures a Per Se standard is never better than an Effects-Based standard; (ii) optimal penalties may be higher when there is legal uncertainty than when there is no legal uncertainty.