The Estimation of Technical Efficiency Effects Models with an Example Applied to the Thai Manufacturing Sector

This paper does two things. First, it presents alternative approaches to the standard methods of estimating productive efficiency using a production function. It favours a parametric approach (viz. the stochastic production frontier approach) over a nonparametric approach (e.g. data envelopment analysis); and, further, one that provides a statistical explanation of efficiency, as well as an estimate of its magnitude. Second, it illustrates the favoured approach (i.e. the ‘single stage procedure’) with estimates of two models of explained inefficiency, using data from the Thai manufacturing sector, after the crisis of 1997. Technical efficiency is modelled as being dependent on capital investment in three major areas (viz. land, machinery and office appliances) where land is intended to proxy the effects of unproductive, speculative capital investment; and both machinery and office appliances are intended to proxy the effects of productive, non-speculative capital investment. The estimates from these models cast new light on the five-year long, post-1997 crisis period in Thailand, suggesting a structural shift from relatively labour intensive to relatively capital intensive production in manufactures from 1998 to 2002.

Technical Appendix-3-Regime asymmetric STAR modeling and exchange rate reversion

The breakdown of the Bretton Woods system and the adoption of generalized oating exchange rates ushered in a new era of exchange rate volatility and uncer- tainty. This increased volatility lead economists to search for economic models able to describe observed exchange rate behavior. The present is a technical Appendix to Cerrato et al. (2009) and presents detailed simulations of the proposed methodology and additional empirical results.

Handling the endogeneity of income to health using a field experiment in Taiwan

This paper uses an exogenous increase in income for a specific sub-group in Taiwan to explore the extent to which higher income leads to higher levels of health and wellbeing. In 1995, the Taiwanese government implemented the Senior Farmer Welfare Benefit Interim Regulation (SFWBIR) which was a pure cash injection, approximately US$110 (£70) per month in 1996, to senior farmers. A Difference-in-differences (DiD) approach is used on survey data from the Taiwanese Health and Living Status of Elderly in 1989 and 1996 to evaluate the short term effect of the SFWBIR on self-assessed health, depression, and life satisfaction. Senior manufacturing workers are employed as a comparison group for the senior farmers in the natural experiment because their demographic backgrounds are similar. This paper provides evidence that the increase in income from the SFWBIR significantly improved the mental health of senior farmers by reducing the scale of depression (CES-D) by 1.718, however, it had no significant short term impact on self-assessed health or life satisfaction.

Technical progress and product reliability under competition and monopoly

Technical progress lowers costs and prices but appears to have an ambiguous effect on product reliabilty. This paper presents a simple model which explains this observation.

Changing Eating Habits - A Field Experiment in Primary Schools

We conduct a field experiment in 31 primary schools in England to test whether incentives to eat fruit and vegetables help children develop healthier habits. The intervention consists of rewarding children with stickers and little gifts for a period of four weeks for choosing a portion of fruit and vegetables at lunch. We compare the effects of two incentive schemes (competition and piece rate) on choices and consumption over the course of the intervention as well as once the incentives are removed and six months later. We find that the intervention had positive effects, but the effects vary substantially according to age and gender. However, we find little evidence of sustained long term effects, except for the children from poorer socio‐economic backgrounds.

How do technical change and technological distance influence the size of the Okun’s Law coefficient?

How does technical change influence the size of the Okun’s Law coefficient? Using a nonlinear version of Okun’s Law augmented with technical change and technological distance, we show that the impact of output movements on unemployment variations is influenced by the imitation or innovation origins of technical change

The Spillover Effects of Monitoring: A Field Experiment.

We provide field experimental evidence of the effects of monitoring in a context where productivity is multi-dimensional and only one dimension is monitored and incentivised. We hire students to do a job for us. The job consists of identifying euro coins. We study the effects of monitoring and penalising mistakes on work quality, and evaluate spillovers on non- incentivised dimensions of productivity (punctuality and theft). We .nd that monitoring improves work quality only if incentives are large, but reduces punctuality substantially irrespectively of the size of incentives. Monitoring does not affect theft, with ten per cent of participants stealing overall. Our setting also allows us to disentangle between possible theoretical mechanisms driving the adverse effects of monitoring. Our .ndings are supportive of a reciprocity mechanism, whereby workers retaliate for being distrusted.

Partner Selection into Policy Relevant Field Experiments

This study investigates the issue of self-selection of stakeholders into participation and collaboration in policy-relevant experiments. We document and test the implications of self-selection in the context of randomised policy experiment we conducted in primary schools in the UK. The main questions we ask are (1) is there evidence of selection on key observable characteristics likely to matter for the outcome of interest and (2) does selection matter for the estimates of treatment eff ects. The experimental work consists in testing the e ffects of an intervention aimed at encouraging children to make more healthy choices at lunch. We recruited schools through local authorities and randomised schools across two incentive treatments and a control group. We document the selection taking place both at the level of local authorities and at the school level. Overall we nd mild evidence of selection on key observables such as obesity levels and socio-economic characteristics. We find evidence of selection along indicators of involvement in healthy lifestyle programmes at the school level, but the magnitude is small. Moreover, We do not find signifi cant di erences in the treatment e ffects of the experiment between variables which, albeit to a mild degree, are correlated with selection into the experiment. To our knowledge, this is the rst study providing direct evidence on the magnitude of self-selection in fi eld experiments.