Assisted Reproductive Technologies (ART) in a Model of Fertility Choice

This paper provides a simple theoretical framework to discuss the relationship between assisted reproductive technologies and the microeconomics of fertility choice. Individuals make choices of education and work along with decisions about whether and when to have children. Decisions regarding fertility are influenced by policy and labor market factors that affect the earnings opportunities of mothers and the costs of raising children. We show how observed differences in these economic factors across countries explain observed different fertility and childbearing age patterns. We then use the model to predict behavioral responses to biomedical improvements in assisted reproductive technologies, and hence the impact of these technologies on fertility.

Optimal progressive taxation in a model with endogenous skill supply.

This paper examines whether efficiency considerations require that optimal labour income taxation is progressive or regressive in a model with skill heterogeneity, endogenous skill acquisition and a production sector with capital-skill complementarity. We find that wage inequality driven by the resource requirements of skill-creation implies progressive labour income taxation in the steady-state as well as along the transition path from the exogenous to optimal policy steady-state. We find that these results are explained by a lower labour supply elasticity for skilled versus unskilled labour which results from the introduction of the skill acquisition technology.

Using Effluent Charges in Promoting Investment in Water Pollution Control Technology: A Model of Coordination Failure among Firms

Untreated wastewater being directly discharged into rivers is a very harmful environmental hazard that needs to be tackled urgently in many countries. In order to safeguard the river ecosystem and reduce water pollution, it is important to have an effluent charge policy that promotes the investment of wastewater treatment technology by domestic firms. This paper considers the strategic interaction between the government and the domestic firms regarding the investment in the wastewater treatment technology and the design of optimal e­ffluent charge policy that should be implemented. In this model, the higher is the proportion of non-investing firms, the higher would be the probability of having to incur an e­ffluent charge and the higher would be that charge. On one hand the government needs to impose a sufficiently strict policy to ensure that firms have strong incentive to invest. On the other hand, it cannot be too strict that it drives out firms which cannot afford to invest in such expensive technology. The paper analyses the factors that affect the probability of investment in this technology. It also explains the difficulty of imposing a strict environment policy in countries that have too many small firms which cannot afford to invest unless subsidised.

Comparing the treatment provided by migrant and nonmigrant health professionals: dentists in Scotland

Many OECD countries are increasingly relying on migrants to address shortages of trained health professionals. One key concern is whether migrant health professionals provide equivalent health care. We compare the treatment provided by migrant and non-migrant health professionals using administrative data from the Scottish dental system. A difference-in-differences model is estimated to examine whether migrant dentists respond differently to case mix and individual circumstances as compared with their non-migrant counterparts, and assess the extent to which any differences diminish over time. After controlling for both observed and unobserved differences between individual dentists and the cohort of patients that they treat, we find that migrant dentists have marginally different practice styles, and the variation diminishes over time within two years of practice.

When Do We Learn to Cooperate? The Role of Social Learning in Social Dilemmas

In this paper, I look at the interaction between social learning and cooperative behavior. I model this using a social dilemma game with publicly observed sequential actions and asymmetric information about pay offs. I find that some informed agents in this model act, individually and without collusion, to conceal the privately optimal action. Because the privately optimal action is socially costly the behavior of informed agents can lead to a Pareto improvement in a social dilemma. In my model I show that it is possible to get cooperative behavior if information is restricted to a small but non-zero proportion of the population. Moreover, such cooperative behavior occurs in a finite setting where it is public knowledge which agent will act last. The proportion of cooperative agents within the population can be made arbitrarily close to 1 by increasing the finite number of agents playing the game. Finally, I show that under a broad set of conditions that it is a Pareto improvement on a corner value, in the ex-ante welfare sense, for an interior proportion of the population to be informed.