Strategic investment and international outsourcing in unionised oligopoly

We critically consider the conventional belief that the attractiveness of international outsourcing lies in cheaper labour costs overseas and that it offers a means to ‘escape’ the power of unions. We develop an oligopoly model in which firms facing unionised domestic labour market choose between producing an intermediate in-house or outsourcing it to a non-unionised foreign supplier that makes a relationship specific investment in developing the intermediate. We show that outsourcing typically results in higher wages and does not always reduce marginal costs. Trade liberalisation favours outsourcing particularly for the relatively less efficient firms.

Employment Protection, Flexibility and Firms’ Strategic Location Decisions under Uncertainty

We construct a model in which oligopolistic firms decide between locating in a country where employment protection implies costly output adjustments and in one without employment protection. Using a two-period three-stage game with uncertainty, we demonstrate that location is influenced by both flexibility and strategic concerns. The strategic effects under Cournot work towards domestic anchorage in the country with employment protection while those under Bertrand do not. Strategic agglomeration can occur in the inflexible country under Cournot and even under Bertrand, provided uncertainty and foreign direct investment costs are low.

Class-size Reduction Policies and the Quality of Entering Teachers

State-wide class-size reduction (CSR) policies have typically failed to produce large achievement gains. One explanation is that the introduction of such policies forces schools to hire relatively low-quality teachers. This paper uses data from an anonymous state to explore whether teacher quality suff ered from the introduction of CSR. We find that it did, but not nearly enough to explain the small achievement effects of CSR. The combined fall in achievement due to hiring lower quality teachers and more inexperienced teachers is small relative to the unrealized gains. Furthermore, between-school diff erences in the quality of incoming teachers cannot explain the poor estimated CSR performance from previous quasi-experimental treatment-control comparisons.