Disaggregating the Household Sector in a 2004 UK Input Output Table and Social Accounting Matrix by Income Quintiles

This paper disaggregates a UK Input-Output (IO) table for 2004 based on household income quintiles from published survey data. In addition to the Input-Output disaggregation, the household components of a UK Income Expenditure (I-E) account used to inform a Social Accounting Matrix (SAM),have also been disaggregated by household income quintile. The focus of this paper is on household expenditure on the UK energy sector.

(Don’t) Make My Vote Count

Proponents of proportional electoral rules often argue that majority rule depresses turnout and may lower welfare due to the 'tyranny of the majority' problem. The present paper studies the impact of electoral rules on turnout and social welfare. We analyze a model of instrumental voting where citizens have private information over their individual cost of voting and over the alternative they prefer. The electoral rule used to select the winning alternative is a combination of majority rule and proportional rule. Results show that the above arguments against majority rule do not hold in this set up. Social welfare and turnout increase with the weight that the electoral rule gives to majority rule when the electorate is expected to be split, and they are independent of the electoral rule employed when the expected size of the minority group tends to zero. However, more proportional rules can increase turnout within the minority group. This effect is stronger the smaller the minority group. We then conclude that majority rule fosters overall turnout and increases social welfare, whereas proportional rule fosters the participation of minorities.