Testing the TASP: An Experimental Investigation of Learning in Games with Unstable Equilibria

We report experiments designed to test between Nash equilibria that are stable and unstable under learning. The “TASP” (Time Average of the Shapley Polygon) gives a precise prediction about what happens when there is divergence from equilibrium under fictitious play like learning processes. We use two 4 x 4 games each with a unique mixed Nash equilibrium; one is stable and one is unstable under learning. Both games are versions of Rock-Paper-Scissors with the addition of a fourth strategy, Dumb. Nash equilibrium places a weight of 1/2 on Dumb in both games, but the TASP places no weight on Dumb when the equilibrium is unstable. We also vary the level of monetary payoffs with higher payoffs predicted to increase instability. We find that the high payoff unstable treatment differs from the others. Frequency of Dumb is lower and play is further from Nash than in the other treatments. That is, we find support for the comparative statics prediction of learning theory, although the frequency of Dumb is substantially greater than zero in the unstable treatments.

The Emperor Has New Clothes: Empirical Tests of Mainstream Theories of Economic Growth

Modern macroeconomic theory utilises optimal control techniques to model the maximisation of individual well-being using a lifetime utility function. Agents face choices over current and future consumption (with resultant implied savings decisions) seeking to maximise the present value of current plus future well-being. However, such inter-temporal welfare-maximising assumptions remain empirically untested. In the work presented here we test whether welfare was in (historical) fact maximised in the US between 1870-2000 and find empirical support for the optimising basis of growth theory, but only once a comprehensive view of what constitutes a country’s wealth or capital is taken into account.

Notes on Agents’ Behavioral Rules Under Adaptive Learning and Studies of Monetary Policy

These notes try to clarify some discussions on the formulation of individual intertemporal behavior under adaptive learning in representative agent models. First, we discuss two suggested approaches and related issues in the context of a simple consumption-saving model. Second, we show that the analysis of learning in the NewKeynesian monetary policy model based on “Euler equations” provides a consistent and valid approach.

The effects of agglomeration on wages: evidence from the micro-level

This paper estimates individual wage equations in order to test two rival non-nested theories of economic agglomeration, namely New Economic Geography (NEG), as represented by the NEG wage equation and urban economic (UE) theory , in which wages relate to employment density. The paper makes an original contribution by evidently being the first empirical paper to examine the issue of agglomeration processes associated with contemporary theory working with micro-level data, highlighting the role of gender and other individual-level characteristics. For male respondents, there is no significant evidence that wage levels are an outcome of the mechanisms suggested by NEG or UE theory, but this is not the case for female respondents. We speculate on the reasons for the gender difference.

'Modern' Phillips Curves and the Implications For The Statistical Process of Inflation

'Modern' theories of the Phillips curve imply that inflation is an integrated, or near integrated process. This paper explains this implication and why these 'modern' theories are logically inconsistent with what is commonly known about the statistical process of inflation.