Flying High and Laying Low in the Public and Private Sectors: A Comparison of Pay Differentials for Full-Time Male Employees in Britain

Using new linked employee-employer data for Britain in 2004, this paper shows that, on average, full-time male public sector employees earn 11.7 log wage points more than their private sector counterparts. Decomposition analysis reveals that the majority of this pay premium is associated with public sector employees having individual characteristics associated with higher pay and to their working in higher paid occupations. Further focussing analysis on the highly skilled and unskilled occupations in both sectors, reveals evidence of workplace segregation positively impacting on earnings in the private sector for the highly skilled, and in the public sector for the unskilled. Substantial earnings gaps between the highly skilled and unskilled are found, and the unexplained components in these gaps are very similar regardless of sector.

Scotland: A New Fiscal Settlement

Executive Summary Many commentators have criticised the strategy currently used to finance the Scottish Parliament – both the block grant system, and the small degree of fiscal autonomy devised in the Calman report and the UK government’s 2009 White Paper. Nevertheless, fiscal autonomy has now been conceded in principle. This paper sets out to identify formally what level of autonomy would be best for the Scottish economy and the institutional changes needed to support that arrangement. Our conclusions are in line with the Steel Commission: that significantly more fiscal powers need to be transferred to Scotland. But what we can then do, which the Steel Commission could not, is to give a detailed blueprint for how this proposal might be implemented in practice. We face two problems. The existing block grant system can and has been criticised from such a wide variety of points of view that it effectively has no credibility left. On the other hand, the Calman proposals (and the UK government proposals that followed) are unworkable because, to function, they require information that the policy makers cannot possibly have; and because, without borrowing for current activities, they contain no mechanism to reconcile contractual spending (most of the budget) with variable revenue flows – which is to invite an eventual breakdown. But in its attempt to fix these problems, the UK White Paper introduces three further difficulties: new grounds for quarrels between the UK and Scottish governments, a long term deflation bias, and a loss of devolution.