Negative rebound and disinvestment effects in response to an improvement in energy efficiency in the UK economy

This paper uses a computable general equilibrium (CGE) framework to investigate the conditions under which rebound effects may occur in response to increases in energy efficiency in the UK national economy. Previous work for the UK has suggested that rebound effects will occur even where key elasticities of substitution in production are set close to zero. The research reported in this paper involves carrying out a systematic sensitivity analysis, where relative price sensitivity is gradually introduced into the system, focusing specifically on elasticities of substitution in production and trade parameters, in order to determine conditions under which rebound effects become a likely outcome. The main result is that, while there is positive pressure for rebound effects even where (direct and indirect) demands for energy are very price inelastic, this may be partially or wholly offset by negative income, competitiveness and disinvestment effects, which also occur in response to falling energy prices. The occurrence of disinvestment effects is of particular interest. These occur where falling energy prices reduce profitability in domestic energy supply sectors, leading to a contraction in capital stock in these sectors, which may in turn lead to rebound effects that are smaller in the long run than in the short run, a result that runs contrary to the predictions of previous theoretical work in this area.

Contagious Illiquidity I: Contagion through Time

This paper is an investigation into the dynamics of asset markets with adverse selection a la Akerlof (1970). The particular question asked is: can market failure at some later date precipitate market failure at an earlier date? The answer is yes: there can be "contagious illiquidity" from the future back to the present. The mechanism works as follows. If the market is expected to break down in the future, then agents holding assets they know to be lemons (assets with low returns) will be forced to hold them for longer - they cannot quickly resell them. As a result, the effective difference in payoff between a lemon and a good asset is greater. But it is known from the static Akerlof model that the greater the payoff differential between lemons and non-lemons, the more likely is the market to break down. Hence market failure in the future is more likely to lead to market failure today. Conversely, if the market is not anticipated to break down in the future, assets can be readily sold and hence an agent discovering that his or her asset is a lemon can quickly jettison it. In effect, there is little difference in payoff between a lemon and a good asset. The logic of the static Akerlof model then runs the other way: the small payoff differential is unlikely to lead to market breakdown today. The conclusion of the paper is that the nature of today's market - liquid or illiquid - hinges critically on the nature of tomorrow's market, which in turn depends on the next day's, and so on. The tail wags the dog.

Liquidity, moral hazard and bank crises

Bank crises, by interrupting liquidity provision, have been viewed as resulting in welfare losses. In a model of banking with moral hazard, we show that second best bank contracts that improve on autarky ex ante require costly crises to occur with positive probability at the interim stage. When bank payoffs are partially appropriable, either directly via imposition of fines or indirectly by the use of bank equity as a collateral, we argue that an appropriately designed ex-ante regime of policy intervention involving conditional monitoring can prevent bank crises.