Do institutions matter for economic fluctuations? Weak property rights in a business cycle model for Mexico

This paper shows that introducing weak property rights in the standard real business cycle (RBC) model can help to explain economic fluctuations. This is motivated by the empirical observation that changes in institutions in emerging markets are related to the evolution of the main macroeconomic variables. In particular, in Mexico, the movements in productivity in the data are associated with changes in institutions, so that we can explain productivity shocks to a large extent as shocks to the quality of institutions. We find that the model with shocks to the degree of protection of property rights only - without technology shocks - can match the second moments in the data for Mexico well. In particular, the fit is better than that of the standard neoclassical model with full protection of property rights regarding the auto-correlations and cross-correlations in the data, especially those related to labor. Viewing productivity shocks as shocks to institutions is also consistent with the stylized fact of falling productivity and non-decreasing labor hours in Mexico over 1980-1994, which is a feature that the neoclassical model cannot match.

Climbing to the top? Foreign Direct Investment and Property Rights.

This paper operates at the interface of the literature on the impact of foreign direct investment (FDI) on host countries, and the literature on the determinants of institutional quality. We argue that FDI contributes to economic development by improving institutional quality in the host country and we attempt to test this proposition using a large panel data set of 70 developing countries during the period 1981 and 2005, and we show that FDI inflows have a positive and highly significant impact on property rights. The result appears to be very robust and is and not affected by model specification, different control variables, or a particular estimation technique. As far as we are aware this is the first paper to empirically test the FDI – property rights linkage.

Harmful competition in the insurance markets

There is a general presumption that competition is a good thing. In this paper we show that competition in the insurance markets can be bad and that adverse selection is in general worse under competition than under monopoly. The reason is that monopoly can exploit its market power to relax incentive constraints by cross-subsidization between different risk types. Cream-skimming behavior, on the contrary, prevents competitive firms from using implicit transfers. In effect monopoly is shown to provide better coverage to those buying insurance but at the cost of limiting participation to insurance. Performing simulation for di erent distributions of risk, we find that monopoly in general performs (much) better than competition in terms of the realization of the gains from trade across all traders in equilibrium. However, most of the surplus is retained by the firm and, as a result, most individuals prefer competitive markets notwithstanding their performance is generally poorer than monopoly.

On the FDI-attracting property of privatizatio

In this paper, we provide an explanation of why privatization may attract foreign investors willing to enter a regional market. Privatization turns the formerly-public firm into a less aggressive competitor since profit-maximizing output is lower than the welfaremaximizing one. The drawback is that social welfare generally decreases. We also investigate tax/subsidy competition for FDI and put forward its potentially positive role. On the one hand, it may reduce the negative impact on welfare of an FDI-attracting privatization. On the other hand, it may prevent a welfare-reducing investment by the foreign firm. This sheds light on the substitute/complementary relationship between the two policies and the two objectives of governments.

Institutions, Property Rights, and Economic Development in Historical Perspective

Institutions, and more speci cally private property rights, have come to be seen as a major determinant of long-run economic development. We evaluate the case for property rights as an explanatory factor of the Industrial Revolution and derive some lessons for the analysis of developing countries today. We pay particular attention to the role of property rights in the accumulation of physical capital and the production of new ideas. The evidence that we review from the economic history literature does not support the institutional thesis.

What drives urban consumption in mainland china? The role of property price dynamics

This paper adds to the literature on wealth effects on consumption by disentangling house price effects on consumption for mainland China. In a stochastic modelling framework, the riskiness, rate of increase and persistence of house price movements have different implications for the consumption/housing ratio. We exploit the geographical variation in property prices by using a quarterly city-level panel dataset for the period 1998Q1 – 2009Q4 and rely on a panel error correction model. Overall, the results suggest a significant long run impact of property prices on consumption. They also broadly confirm the predictions from the theoretical model.

EMU, EU, Market Integration and Consumption Smoothing

We take a new approach to the study of the impact of EMU on consumption smoothing. Rather than relying on inferences based on the behavior of consumption levels or growth, we focus on consumption volatility and therefore on smoothing more directly. Consequently, we find that even though EMU tends to smooth consumption, it is not through cross-country property and claims. Rather it comes through the promotion of the tradability of goods, capital in particular: specifically, the encouragement of price competition, contestable home markets, ability to borrow and buy insurance at home, and the harmonization of regulations. Some of the consumption smoothing may also depend on EU membership rather than EMU as such but EMU adds to it. As a fundamental part of the analysis, the paper uses a new index of currency union which focuses on the ratio of trade with other countries sharing the same currency relative to total foreign trade.