Optimism and commitment: An elementary theory of bargaining and war

We propose an elementary theory of wars fought by fully rational contenders. Two parties play a Markov game that combines stages of bargaining with stages where one side has the ability to impose surrender on the other. Under uncertainty and incomplete information, in the unique equilibrium of the game, long confrontations occur: war arises when reality disappoints initial (rational) optimism, and it persist longer when both agents are optimists but reality proves both wrong. Bargaining proposals that are rejected initially might eventually be accepted after several periods of confrontation. We provide an explicit computation of the equilibrium, evaluating the probability of war, and its expected losses as a function of i) the costs of confrontation, ii) the asymmetry of the split imposed under surrender, and iii) the strengths of contenders at attack and defense. Changes in these parameters display non-monotonic effects.

Estimating Phillips Curves in Turbulent Times using the ECB’s Survey of Professional Forecasters

This paper uses forecasts from the European Central Bank's Survey of Professional Forecasters to investigate the relationship between inflation and inflation expectations in the euro area. We use theoretical structures based on the New Keynesian and Neoclassical Phillips curves to inform our empirical work. Given the relatively short data span of the Survey of Professional Forecasters and the need to control for many explanatory variables, we use dynamic model averaging in order to ensure a parsimonious econometric speci cation. We use both regression-based and VAR-based methods. We find no support for the backward looking behavior embedded in the Neo-classical Phillips curve. Much more support is found for the forward looking behavior of the New Keynesian Phillips curve, but most of this support is found after the beginning of the financial crisis.

Commitment vs. Discretion in the UK: An Empirical Investigation of the Monetary and Fiscal Policy Regime

This paper investigates the conduct of monetary and fiscal policy in the post-ERM period in the UK. Using a simple DSGE New Keynesian model of non-cooperative monetary and fiscal policy interactions under fiscal intra-period leadership, we demonstrate that the past policy in the UK is better explained by optimal policy under discretion than under commitment. We estimate policy objectives of both policy makers. We demonstrate that fiscal policy plays an important role in identifying the monetary policy regime.