An Empirical Examination of the R&D Boundaries of the Firm - A Problem-Solving Perspective

We consider, both theoretically and empirically, how different organization modes are aligned to govern the efficient solving of technological problems. The data set is a sample from the Chinese consumer electronics industry. Following mainly the problem solving perspective (PSP) within the knowledge based view (KBV), we develop and test several PSP and KBV hypotheses, in conjunction with competing transaction cost economics (TCE) alternatives, in an examination of the determinants of the R&D organization mode. The results show that a firm’s existing knowledge base is the single most important explanatory variable. Problem complexity and decomposability are also found to be important, consistent with the theoretical predictions of the PSP, but it is suggested that these two dimensions need to be treated as separate variables. TCE hypotheses also receive some support, but the estimation results seem more supportive of the PSP and the KBV than the TCE.

Who Matters in Coordination Problems?

We consider a common investment project that is vulnerable to a self-ful lling coordination failure and hence is strategically risky. Based on their private information, agents - who have heterogeneous investment incentives - form expectations or 'sentiments' about the project's outcome. We find that the sum of these sentiments is constant across di erent strategy profiles and it is independent of the distribution of incentives. As a result, we can think of sentiment as a scarce resource divided up among the di erent payo types. Applying this nding, we show that agents who bene t little from the project's success have a large impact on the coordination process. The agents with small bene ts invest only if their sentiment towards the project is large per unit investment cost. As the average sentiment is constant, a subsidy decreasing the investment costs of these agents will \free up" a large amount of sentiment, provoking a large impact on the whole economy. Intuitively, these agents, insensitive to the project's outcome and hence to the actions of others, are in uential because they modify their equilibrium behavior only if the others change theirs substantially.