Why is it so Hard to Value Intangibles? Evidence from Investments in High-Technology Start-Ups

The paper uses a range of primary-source empirical evidence to address the question: ‘why is it to hard to value intangible assets?’ The setting is venture capital investment in high technology companies. While the investors are risk specialists and financial experts, the entrepreneurs are more knowledgeable about product innovation. Thus the context lends itself to analysis within a principal-agent framework, in which information asymmetry may give rise to adverse selection, pre-contract, and moral hazard, post-contract. We examine how the investor might attenuate such problems and attach a value to such high-tech investments in what are often merely intangible assets, through expert due diligence, monitoring and control. Qualitative evidence is used to qualify the more clear cut picture provided by a principal-agent approach to a more mixed picture in which the ‘art and science’ of investment appraisal are utilised by both parties alike

Multi-agent contracting with countervailing incentives and limited liability

We consider a principal who deals with a privately informed agent protected by limited liability in a correlated information setting. The agent's technology is such that the fixed cost declines with the marginal cost (the type), so that countervailing incentives may arise. We show that, with high liability, the first-best outcome can be effected for any type if (1) the fixed cost is non-concave in type, under the contract that yields the smallest feasible loss to the agent; (2) the fixed cost is not very concave in type, under the contract that yields the maximum sustainable loss to the agent. We further show that, with low liability, the first-best outcome is still implemented for a non-degenerate range of types if the fixed cost is less concave in type than some given threshold, which tightens as the liability reduces. The optimal contract entails pooling otherwise.

Optimal contracting with private information on cost expectation and variability

We study the screening problem that arises in a framework where, initially, the agent is privately informed about both the expected production cost and the cost variability and, at a later stage, he learns privately the cost realization. The speci c set of relevant incentive constraints, and so the characteristics of the optimal mechanism, depend nely upon the curvature of the principal s marginal surplus function as well as the relative importance of the two initial information problems. Pooling of production levels is optimally induced with respect to the cost variability when the principal's knowledge imperfection about the latter is sufficiently less important than that about the expected cost.

Moral Hazard with Counterfeit Signals

In many moral hazard problems, the principal evaluates the agent's performance based on signals which the agent may suppress and replace with counterfeits. This form of fraud may affect the design of optimal contracts drastically, leading to complete market failure in extreme cases. I show that in optimal contracts, the principal deters all fraud, and does so by two complementary mechanisms. First, the principal punishes signals that are suspicious, i.e. appear counterfeit. Second, the principal is lenient on bad signals that the agent could suppress, but does not.