On the Relationship between Market Power and Bank Risk Taking

We analyse risk-taking behaviour of banks in the context of spatial competition. Banks mobilise unsecured deposits by offering deposit rates, which they invest either in a prudent or a gambling asset. Limited liability along with high return of a successful gamble induce moral hazard at the bank level. We show that when the market power is low, banks invest in the gambling asset. On the other hand, for sufficiently high levels of market power, all banks choose the prudent asset to invest in. We further show that a merger of two neighboring banks increases the likelihood of prudent behaviour. Finally, introduction of a deposit insurance scheme exacerbates banks’ moral hazard problem.

Harmful competition in the insurance markets

There is a general presumption that competition is a good thing. In this paper we show that competition in the insurance markets can be bad and that adverse selection is in general worse under competition than under monopoly. The reason is that monopoly can exploit its market power to relax incentive constraints by cross-subsidization between different risk types. Cream-skimming behavior, on the contrary, prevents competitive firms from using implicit transfers. In effect monopoly is shown to provide better coverage to those buying insurance but at the cost of limiting participation to insurance. Performing simulation for di erent distributions of risk, we find that monopoly in general performs (much) better than competition in terms of the realization of the gains from trade across all traders in equilibrium. However, most of the surplus is retained by the firm and, as a result, most individuals prefer competitive markets notwithstanding their performance is generally poorer than monopoly.

The economics of power and control

John Hardman Moore outlines his joint research with Oliver Hart, looking at the economics of power and control and the foundations of contractual incompleteness

Factors Affecting the Financial Success of Motion Pictures: What is the Role of Star Power?

In the mid-1940s, American film industry was on its way up to its golden era as studios started mass-producing iconic feature films. The escalating increase in popularity of Hollywood stars was actively suggested for its direct links to box office success by academics. Using data collected in 2007, this paper carries out an empirical investigation on how different factors, including star power, affect the revenue of ‘home-run’ movies in Hollywood. Due to the subjective nature of star power, two different approaches were used: (1) number of nominations and wins of Academy Awards by the key players, and (2) average lifetime gross revenue of films involving the key players preceding the sample year. It is found that number of Academy awards nominations and wins was not statistically significant in generating box office revenue, whereas star power based on the second approach was statistically significant. Other significant factors were critics’ reviews, screen coverage and top distributor, while number of Academy awards, MPAA-rating, seasonality, being a sequel and popular genre were not statistically significant.