Harmful competition in the insurance markets

There is a general presumption that competition is a good thing. In this paper we show that competition in the insurance markets can be bad and that adverse selection is in general worse under competition than under monopoly. The reason is that monopoly can exploit its market power to relax incentive constraints by cross-subsidization between different risk types. Cream-skimming behavior, on the contrary, prevents competitive firms from using implicit transfers. In effect monopoly is shown to provide better coverage to those buying insurance but at the cost of limiting participation to insurance. Performing simulation for di erent distributions of risk, we find that monopoly in general performs (much) better than competition in terms of the realization of the gains from trade across all traders in equilibrium. However, most of the surplus is retained by the firm and, as a result, most individuals prefer competitive markets notwithstanding their performance is generally poorer than monopoly.

Monetary Policy and Heterogeneous Expectations

This paper studies the implications for monetary policy of heterogeneous expectations in a New Keynesian model. The assumption of rational expectations is replaced with parsimonious forecasting models where agents select between predictors that are underparameterized. In a Misspecification Equilibrium agents only select the best-performing statistical models. We demonstrate that, even when monetary policy rules satisfy the Taylor principle by adjusting nominal interest rates more than one for one with inflation, there may exist equilibria with Intrinsic Heterogeneity. Under certain conditions, there may exist multiple misspecification equilibria. We show that these findings have important implications for business cycle dynamics and for the design of monetary policy.

Why do UK banks securitize?

The eight years from 2000 to 2008 saw a rapid growth in the use of securitization by UK banks. We aim to identify the reasons that contributed to this rapid growth. The time period (2000 to 2010) covered by our study is noteworthy as it covers the pre- financial crisis credit-boom, the peak of the fi nancial crisis and its aftermath. In the wake of the financial crisis, many governments, regulators and political commentators have pointed an accusing finger at the securitization market - even in the absence of a detailed statistical and economic analysis. We contribute to the extant literature by performing such an analysis on UK banks, focussing principally on whether it is the need for liquidity (i.e. the funding of their balance sheets), or the desire to engage in regulatory capital arbitrage or the need for credit risk transfer that has led to UK banks securitizing their assets. We show that securitization has been signi ficantly driven by liquidity reasons. In addition, we observe a positive link between securitization and banks credit risk. We interpret these latter findings as evidence that UK banks which engaged in securitization did so, in part, to transfer credit risk and that, in comparison to UK banks which did not use securitization, they had more credit risk to transfer in the sense that they originated lower quality loans and held lower quality assets. We show that banks which issued more asset-backed securities before the financial crisis suffered more defaults after the financial crisis.

Suppliers of Priors: A Theory of Retailing Inspired by the Market for Chinese Antiquities

Adverse selection may thwart trade between an informed seller, who knows the probability p that an item of antiquity is genuine, and an uninformed buyer, who does not know p. The buyer might not be wholly uninformed, however. Suppose he can perform a simple inspection, a test of his own: the probability that an item passes the test is g if the item is genuine, but only f < g if it is fake. Given that the buyer is no expert, his test may have little power: f may be close to g. Unfortunately, without much power, the buyer's test will not resolve the difficulty of adverse selection; gains from trade may remain unexploited. But now consider a "store", where the seller groups a number of items, perhaps all with the same quality, the same probability p of being genuine. (We show that in equilibrium the seller will choose to group items in this manner.) Now the buyer can conduct his test across a large sample, perhaps all, of a group of items in the seller's store. He can thereby assess the overall quality of these items; he can invert the aggregate of his test results to uncover the underlying p; he can form a "prior". There is thus no longer asymmetric information between seller and buyer: gains from trade can be exploited. This is our theory of retailing: by grouping items together - setting up a store - a seller is able to supply buyers with priors, as well as the items themselves. We show that the weaker the power of the buyer�s test (the closer f is to g), the greater the seller�s profit. So the seller has no incentive to assist the buyer � e.g., by performing her own tests on the items, or by cleaning them to reveal more about their true age. The paper ends with an analysis of which sellers should specialise in which qualities. We show that quality will be low in busy locations and high in expensive locations.