Partner Selection into Policy Relevant Field Experiments

This study investigates the issue of self-selection of stakeholders into participation and collaboration in policy-relevant experiments. We document and test the implications of self-selection in the context of randomised policy experiment we conducted in primary schools in the UK. The main questions we ask are (1) is there evidence of selection on key observable characteristics likely to matter for the outcome of interest and (2) does selection matter for the estimates of treatment eff ects. The experimental work consists in testing the e ffects of an intervention aimed at encouraging children to make more healthy choices at lunch. We recruited schools through local authorities and randomised schools across two incentive treatments and a control group. We document the selection taking place both at the level of local authorities and at the school level. Overall we nd mild evidence of selection on key observables such as obesity levels and socio-economic characteristics. We find evidence of selection along indicators of involvement in healthy lifestyle programmes at the school level, but the magnitude is small. Moreover, We do not find signifi cant di erences in the treatment e ffects of the experiment between variables which, albeit to a mild degree, are correlated with selection into the experiment. To our knowledge, this is the rst study providing direct evidence on the magnitude of self-selection in fi eld experiments.

Exclusive Nightclubs and Lonely Hearts Columns: Nonmonotone Participation in Optional Intermediation

In many decentralised markets, the traders who benefit most from an exchange do not employ intermediaries even though they could easily afford them. At the same time, employing intermediaries is not worthwhile for traders who benefit little from trade. Together, these decisions amount to non-monotone participation choices in intermediation: only traders of middle “type” employ intermediaries, while the rest, the high and the low types, prefer to search for a trading partner directly. We provide a theoretical foundation for this, hitherto unexplained, phenomenon. We build a dynamic matching model, where a trader’s equilibrium bargaining share is a convex increasing function of her type. We also show that this is indeed a necessary condition for the existence of non-monotone equilibria.

Factors Affecting Audit Quality in the 2007 UK Regulatory Environment: Perceptions of Chief Financial Officers, Audit Committee Chairs and Audit Engagement Partners

In line with global changes, the UK regulatory regime for audit and corporate governance has changed significantly since the Enron scandal, with an increased role for audit committees and independent inspection of audit firms. UK listed company chief financial officers (CFOs), audit committee chairs (ACCs) and audit partners (APs) were surveyed in 2007 to obtain views on the impact of 36 economic and regulatory factors on audit quality. 498 usable responses were received, representing a response rate of 36%. All groups rated various audit committee interactions with auditors among the factors most enhancing audit quality. Exploratory factor analysis reduces the 36 factors to nine uncorrelated dimensions. In order of extraction, these are: economic risk; audit committee activities; risk of regulatory action; audit firm ethics; economic independence of auditor; audit partner rotation; risk of client loss; audit firm size; and, lastly, International Standards on Auditing (ISAs) and audit inspection. In addition to the activities of the audit committee, risk factors for the auditor (both economic and certain regulatory risks) are believed to most enhance audit quality. However, ISAs and the audit inspection regime, aspects of the ‘standards-surveillance compliance’ regulatory system, are viewed as less effective. Respondents commented that aspects of the changed regime are largely process and compliance driven, with high costs for limited benefits, supporting psychological bias regulation theory that claims there is overconfidence that a useful regulatory intervention exists.