A Salience Theory of Choice Errors

We study a psychologically based foundation for choice errors. The decision maker applies a preference ranking after forming a 'consideration set' prior to choosing an alternative. Membership of the consideration set is determined both by the alternative specific salience and by the rationality of the agent (his general propensity to consider all alternatives). The model turns out to include a logit formulation as a special case. In general, it has a rich set of implications both for exogenous parameters and for a situation in which alternatives can a¤ect their own salience (salience games). Such implications are relevant to assess the link between 'revealed' preferences and 'true' preferences: for example, less rational agents may paradoxically express their preference through choice more truthfully than more rational agents.

An issue with own-rates: Keynes borrows from Sraffa , Sraffa criticises Keynes, and present-day commentators get hold of the wrong end of the stick

Scholars who in recent years have studied the Sraffa papers held in the Wren Library of Trinity College, Cambridge, have concluded from Sraffa’s critical (but unpublished) observations on Chapter 17 of Keynes’s General Theory that he rejected Keynes’s central proposition that the rate of interest on money may come to ‘rule the roost’, thus dragging the economy into recession. While Sraffa does indeed express dissatisfaction with Chapter 17, the commentators have, we believe, misunderstood his concern: we suggest that he was unhappy with the ‘own-rates’ terminology employed by Keynes rather than with the substance of the theory developed in Chapter 17.