Avoidance Policies – A New Conceptual Framework

This paper develops a general theoretical framework within which a heterogeneous group taxpayers confront a market that supplies a variety of schemes for reducing tax liability, and uses this framework to explore the impact of a wide range of anti-avoidance policies. Schemes differ in their legal effectiveness and hence in the risks to which they expose taxpayers - risks which go beyond the risk of audit considered in the conventional literature on evasion. Given the individual taxpayer’s circumstances, the prices charged for the schemes and the policy environment, the model predicts (i) whether or not any given taxpayer will acquire a scheme, and (ii) if they do so, which type of scheme they will acquire. The paper then analyses how these decisions, and hence the tax gap, are influenced by four generic types of policy: Disclosure – earlier information leading to faster closure of loopholes; Penalties – introduction of penalties for failed avoidance; Policy Design – fundamental policy changes that design out opportunities for avoidance; Product Register - the introduction of GAARs or mini-GAARs that give greater clarity about how different types of scheme will be treated. The paper shows that when considering the indirect/behavioural effects of policies on the tax gap it is important to recognise that these operate on two different margins. First policies will have deterrence effects – their impact on the quantum of taxpayers choosing to acquire different types schemes as distinct to acquiring no scheme at all. There will be a range of such deterrence effects reflecting the range of schemes available in the market. But secondly, since different schemes generate different tax gaps, policies will also have switching effects as they induce taxpayers who previously acquired one type of scheme to acquire another. The first three types of policy generate positive deterrence effects but differ in the switching effects they produce. The fourth type of policy produces mixed deterrence effects.

Revealed cardinal preference

I prove that as long as we allow the marginal utility for money (lambda) to vary between purchases (similarly to the budget) then the quasi-linear and the ordinal budget-constrained models rationalize the same data. However, we know that lambda is approximately constant. I provide a simple constructive proof for the necessary and sufficient condition for the constant lambda rationalization, which I argue should replace the Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preference in empirical studies of consumer behavior. 'Go Cardinals!' It is the minimal requirement of any scientifi c theory that it is consistent with the data it is trying to explain. In the case of (Hicksian) consumer theory it was revealed preference -introduced by Samuelson (1938,1948) - that provided an empirical test to satisfy this need. At that time most of economic reasoning was done in terms of a competitive general equilibrium, a concept abstract enough so that it can be built on the ordinal preferences over baskets of goods - even if the extremely specialized ones of Arrow and Debreu. However, starting in the sixties, economics has moved beyond the 'invisible hand' explanation of how -even competitive- markets operate. A seemingly unavoidable step of this 'revolution' was that ever since, most economic research has been carried out in a partial equilibrium context. Now, the partial equilibrium approach does not mean that the rest of the markets are ignored, rather that they are held constant. In other words, there is a special commodity -call it money - that reflects the trade-offs of moving purchasing power across markets. As a result, the basic building block of consumer behavior in partial equilibrium is no longer the consumer's preferences over goods, rather her valuation of them, in terms of money. This new paradigm necessitates a new theory of revealed preference.

The Impact of Population Ageing on the Labour Market: Evidence from Overlapping Generations Computable General Equilibrium (OLG-CGE) Model of Scotland

This paper presents a dynamic Overlapping Generations Computable General Equilibrium (OLG-CGE) model of Scotland. The model is used to examine the impact of population ageing on the labour market. More specifically, it is used to evaluate the effects of labour force decline and labour force ageing on key macro-economic variables. The second effect is assumed to operate through age-specific productivity and labour force participation. In the analysis, particular attention is paid to how population ageing impinges on the government expenditure constraint. The basic structure of the model follows in the Auerbach and Kotlikoff tradition. However, the model takes into consideration directly age-specific mortality. This is analogous to “building in” a cohort-component population projection structure to the model, which allows more complex and more realistic demographic scenarios to be considered.

The Impact of Population Ageing on the Labour Market: Evidence from Overlapping Generations Computable General Equilibrium (OLG-CGE) Model of Scotland

This paper presents a dynamic Overlapping Generations Computable General Equilibrium (OLG-CGE) model of Scotland. The model is used to examine the impact of population ageing on the labour market. More specifically, it is used to evaluate the effects of labour force decline and labour force ageing on key macro-economic variables. The second effect is assumed to operate through age-specific productivity and labour force participation. In the analysis, particular attention is paid to how population ageing impinges on the government expenditure constraint. The basic structure of the model follows in the Auerbach and Kotlikoff tradition. However, the model takes into consideration directly age-specific mortality. This is analogous to “building in” a cohort-component population projection structure to the model, which allows more complex and more realistic demographic scenarios to be considered.

Picking the Right Budget Constraint for Scotland

This position paper considers the devolution of further fiscal powers to the Scottish Parliament in the context of the objectives and remit of the Smith Commission. The argument builds on our discussion of fiscal decentralization made in our previous published work on this topic. We ask what sort of budget constraint the Scottish Parliament should operate with. A soft budget constraint (SBC) allows the Scottish Parliament to spend without having to consider all of the tax and, therefore, political consequences, of that spending, which is effectively the position at the moment. The incentives to promote economic growth through fiscal policy – on both the tax and spending sides are weak to non-existent. This is what the Scotland Act, 1998, and the continuing use of the Barnett block grant, gave Scotland. Now other budget constraints are being discussed – those of the Calman Commission (2009) and the Scotland Act (2012), as well as the ones offered in 2014 by the various political parties – Scottish Conservatives, Scottish Greens, Scottish Labour, the Scottish Liberal Democrats and the Scottish Government. There is also the budget constraint designed by the Holtham Commission (2010) for Wales that could just as well be used in Scotland. We examine to what extent these offer the hard budget constraint (HBC) that would bring tax policy firmly into the realm of Scottish politics, asking the Scottish electorate and Parliament to consider the costs to them of increasing spending in terms of higher taxes; or the benefits to them of using public spending to grow the tax base and own-sourced taxes? The hardest budget constraint of all is offered by independence but, as is now known, a clear majority of those who voted in the referendum did not vote for this form of budget constraint. Rather they voted for a significant further devolution of fiscal powers while remaining within a political and monetary union with the rest of the UK, with the risk pooling and revenue sharing that this implies. It is not surprising therefore that none of the budget constraints on offer, apart from the SNP’s, come close to the HBC of independence. However, the almost 25% fall in the price of oil since the referendum, a resource stream so central to the SNP’s economic policy making, underscores why there is a need for a trade off between a HBC and risk pooling and revenue sharing. Ranked according to the desirable characteristic of offering something approaching a HBC the least desirable are those of the Calman Commission, the Scotland Act, 2012, and Scottish Labour. In all of these the ‘elasticity’ of the block grant in the face of failure to grow the Scottish tax base is either not defined or is very elastic – meaning that the risk of failure is shuffled off to taxpayers outside of Scotland. The degree of HBC in the Scottish Conservative, Scottish Greens and Scottish Liberal Democrats proposals are much more desirable from an economic growth point of view, the latter even embracing the HBC proposed by the Holtham Commission that combines serious tax policy with welfare support in the long-run. We judge that the budget constraint in the SNP’s proposals is too hard as it does not allow for continuation of the ‘welfare union’ in the UK. We also consider that in the case of a generalized UK economic slow requiring a fiscal stimulus that the Scottish Parliament be allowed increased borrowing to be repaid in the next economic upturn.