Electoral Uncertainty and the Deficit Bias in a New Keynesian Economy

Recent attempts to incorporate optimal fiscal policy into New Keynesian models subject to nominal inertia, have tended to assume that policy makers are benevolent and have access to a commitment technology. A separate literature, on the New Political Economy, has focused on real economies where there is strategic use of policy instruments in a world of political conflict. In this paper we combine these literatures and assume that policy is set in a New Keynesian economy by one of two policy makers facing electoral uncertainty (in terms of infrequent elections and an endogenous voting mechanism). The policy makers generally share the social welfare function, but differ in their preferences over fiscal expenditure (in its size and/or composition). Given the environment, policy shall be realistically constrained to be time-consistent. In a sticky-price economy, such heterogeneity gives rise to the possibility of one policy maker utilising (nominal) debt strategically to tie the hands of the other party, and influence the outcome of any future elections. This can give rise to a deficit bias, implying a sub-optimally high level of steady-state debt, and can also imply a sub-optimal response to shocks. The steady-state distortions and inflation bias this generates, combined with the volatility induced by the electoral cycle in a sticky-price environment, can significantly

Fiscal Sustainability in a New Keynesian Model

Recent work on optimal monetary and fiscal policy in New Keynesian models suggests that it is optimal to allow steady-state debt to follow a random walk. Leith and Wren-Lewis (2012) consider the nature of the timeinconsistency involved in such a policy and its implication for discretionary policy-making. We show that governments are tempted, given inflationary expectations, to utilize their monetary and fiscal instruments in the initial period to change the ultimate debt burden they need to service. We demonstrate that this temptation is only eliminated if following shocks, the new steady-state debt is equal to the original (efficient) debt level even though there is no explicit debt target in the government’s objective function. Analytically and in a series of numerical simulations we show which instrument is used to stabilize the debt depends crucially on the degree of nominal inertia and the size of the debt-stock. We also show that the welfare consequences of introducing debt are negligible for precommitment policies, but can be significant for discretionary policy. Finally, we assess the credibility of commitment policy by considering a quasi-commitment policy which allows for different probabilities of reneging on past promises. This on-line Appendix extends the results of this paper.

Fiscal Sustainability in a New Keynesian Model

Recent work on optimal monetary and fiscal policy in New Keynesian models suggests that it is optimal to allow steady-state debt to follow a random walk. Leith and Wren-Lewis (2012) consider the nature of the timeinconsistency involved in such a policy and its implication for discretionary policy-making. We show that governments are tempted, given inflationary expectations, to utilize their monetary and fiscal instruments in the initial period to change the ultimate debt burden they need to service. We demonstrate that this temptation is only eliminated if following shocks, the new steady-state debt is equal to the original (efficient) debt level even though there is no explicit debt target in the government’s objective function. Analytically and in a series of numerical simulations we show which instrument is used to stabilize the debt depends crucially on the degree of nominal inertia and the size of the debt-stock. We also show that the welfare consequences of introducing debt are negligible for precommitment policies, but can be significant for discretionary policy. Finally, we assess the credibility of commitment policy by considering a quasi-commitment policy which allows for different probabilities of reneging on past promises. This on-line Appendix extends the results of this paper.

Entrepreneurial Orientation, Intangible Assets and Firm Growth: the impact of ‘Spirit and Material’ on the growth of Chinese private firms

This paper has three contributions. First, it shows how field work within small firms in PR Chinese has provided new evidence which enables us to measure and calibrate Entrepreneurial Orientation (EO), as ‘spirit’, and Intangible Assets (IA), as ‘material’, for use in models of small firm growth. Second, it uses inter-item correlation analysis and both exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis to provide new measures of EO and IA, in index and in vector form, for use in econometric models of firm growth. Third, it estimates two new econometric models of small firm employment growth in PR China, under the null hypothesis of Gibrat’s Law, using our two new index-based and vector-based measures of EO and IA. Estimation is by OLS with adjustment for heteroscedasticity, and for sample selectivity. Broadly, it finds that EO attributes have had little significant impact on small firm growth, and indeed innovativeness and pro-activity paradoxically may even dampen growth. However, IA attributes have had a positive and significant impact on growth, with networking, and technological knowledge being of prime importance, and intellectual property and human capital being of lesser but still significant importance. In the light of these results, Gibrat’s Law is generalized, and Jovanovic’s learning theory is extended, to emphasise the importance of IA to growth. These findings cast new empirical light on the oft-quoted national slogan in PR China of “spirit and material”. So far as small firms are concerned, this paper suggests that their contribution to PR China’s remarkable economic growth is not so much attributable to the ‘spirit’ of enterprise (as suggested by propaganda) as, more prosaically, to the pursuit of the ‘material’.

The Inflation Bias under Calvo and Rotemberg Pricing.

New Keynesian models rely heavily on two workhorse models of nominal inertia - price contracts of random duration (Calvo, 1983) and price adjustment costs (Rotemberg, 1982) - to generate a meaningful role for monetary policy. These alternative descriptions of price stickiness are often used interchangeably since, to a first order of approximation they imply an isomorphic Phillips curve and, if the steady-state is efficient, identical objectives for the policy maker and as a result in an LQ framework, the same policy conclusions. In this paper we compute time-consistent optimal monetary policy in bench-mark New Keynesian models containing each form of price stickiness. Using global solution techniques we find that the inflation bias problem under Calvo contracts is significantly greater than under Rotemberg pricing, despite the fact that the former typically significant exhibits far greater welfare costs of inflation. The rates of inflation observed under this policy are non-trivial and suggest that the model can comfortably generate the rates of inflation at which the problematic issues highlighted in the trend inflation literature emerge, as well as the movements in trend inflation emphasized in empirical studies of the evolution of inflation. Finally, we consider the response to cost push shocks across both models and find these can also be significantly different. The choice of which form of nominal inertia to adopt is not innocuous.

The Estimation of Technical Efficiency Effects Models with an Example Applied to the Thai Manufacturing Sector

This paper does two things. First, it presents alternative approaches to the standard methods of estimating productive efficiency using a production function. It favours a parametric approach (viz. the stochastic production frontier approach) over a nonparametric approach (e.g. data envelopment analysis); and, further, one that provides a statistical explanation of efficiency, as well as an estimate of its magnitude. Second, it illustrates the favoured approach (i.e. the ‘single stage procedure’) with estimates of two models of explained inefficiency, using data from the Thai manufacturing sector, after the crisis of 1997. Technical efficiency is modelled as being dependent on capital investment in three major areas (viz. land, machinery and office appliances) where land is intended to proxy the effects of unproductive, speculative capital investment; and both machinery and office appliances are intended to proxy the effects of productive, non-speculative capital investment. The estimates from these models cast new light on the five-year long, post-1997 crisis period in Thailand, suggesting a structural shift from relatively labour intensive to relatively capital intensive production in manufactures from 1998 to 2002.

On Identification of Bayesian DSGE Models

In recent years there has been increasing concern about the identification of parameters in dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models. Given the structure of DSGE models it may be difficult to determine whether a parameter is identified. For the researcher using Bayesian methods, a lack of identification may not be evident since the posterior of a parameter of interest may differ from its prior even if the parameter is unidentified. We show that this can even be the case even if the priors assumed on the structural parameters are independent. We suggest two Bayesian identification indicators that do not suffer from this difficulty and are relatively easy to compute. The first applies to DSGE models where the parameters can be partitioned into those that are known to be identified and the rest where it is not known whether they are identified. In such cases the marginal posterior of an unidentified parameter will equal the posterior expectation of the prior for that parameter conditional on the identified parameters. The second indicator is more generally applicable and considers the rate at which the posterior precision gets updated as the sample size (T) is increased. For identified parameters the posterior precision rises with T, whilst for an unidentified parameter its posterior precision may be updated but its rate of update will be slower than T. This result assumes that the identified parameters are pT-consistent, but similar differential rates of updates for identified and unidentified parameters can be established in the case of super consistent estimators. These results are illustrated by means of simple DSGE models.

A New Model Of Trend Inflation

This paper introduces a new model of trend (or underlying) inflation. In contrast to many earlier approaches, which allow for trend inflation to evolve according to a random walk, ours is a bounded model which ensures that trend inflation is constrained to lie in an interval. The bounds of this interval can either be fixed or estimated from the data. Our model also allows for a time-varying degree of persistence in the transitory component of inflation. The bounds placed on trend inflation mean that standard econometric methods for estimating linear Gaussian state space models cannot be used and we develop a posterior simulation algorithm for estimating the bounded trend inflation model. In an empirical exercise with CPI inflation we find the model to work well, yielding more sensible measures of trend inflation and forecasting better than popular alternatives such as the unobserved components stochastic volatility model.

No Good Deals - No Bad Models

Faced with the problem of pricing complex contingent claims, an investor seeks to make his valuations robust to model uncertainty. We construct a notion of a model- uncertainty-induced utility function and show that model uncertainty increases the investor's eff ective risk aversion. Using the model-uncertainty-induced utility function, we extend the \No Good Deals" methodology of Cochrane and Sa a-Requejo [2000] to compute lower and upper good deal bounds in the presence of model uncertainty. We illustrate the methodology using some numerical examples.

A New Index of Financial Conditions

We use factor augmented vector autoregressive models with time-varying coefficients to construct a financial conditions index. The time-variation in the parameters allows for the weights attached to each financial variable in the index to evolve over time. Furthermore, we develop methods for dynamic model averaging or selection which allow the financial variables entering into the FCI to change over time. We discuss why such extensions of the existing literature are important and show them to be so in an empirical application involving a wide range of financial variables.

The Extent and Cyclicality of Career Changes: Evidence for the UK

Using quarterly data for the U.K. from 1993 through 2012, we document that in economic downturns a smaller fraction of unemployed workers change their career when starting a new job. Moreover, the proportion of total hires that involves a career change for the worker also drops in recessions. Together with a simultaneous drop in overall turnover, this implies that the number of career changes declines during recessions. These results indicate that recessions are times of subdued reallocation rather than of accelerated and involuntary structural transformation. We back this interpretation up with evidence on who changes careers, which industries and occupations they come from and go to, and at which wage gains.