Negative rebound and disinvestment effects in response to an improvement in energy efficiency in the UK economy

This paper uses a computable general equilibrium (CGE) framework to investigate the conditions under which rebound effects may occur in response to increases in energy efficiency in the UK national economy. Previous work for the UK has suggested that rebound effects will occur even where key elasticities of substitution in production are set close to zero. The research reported in this paper involves carrying out a systematic sensitivity analysis, where relative price sensitivity is gradually introduced into the system, focusing specifically on elasticities of substitution in production and trade parameters, in order to determine conditions under which rebound effects become a likely outcome. The main result is that, while there is positive pressure for rebound effects even where (direct and indirect) demands for energy are very price inelastic, this may be partially or wholly offset by negative income, competitiveness and disinvestment effects, which also occur in response to falling energy prices. The occurrence of disinvestment effects is of particular interest. These occur where falling energy prices reduce profitability in domestic energy supply sectors, leading to a contraction in capital stock in these sectors, which may in turn lead to rebound effects that are smaller in the long run than in the short run, a result that runs contrary to the predictions of previous theoretical work in this area.

Negative investment in China: financing constraints and restructuring versus growth

This paper attempts to address a puzzle in China’s investment pattern: despite high aggregate investment and remarkable economic growth, negative net investment is commonly found at the microeconomic level. Using a large firm-level dataset, we test three hypotheses to explain the existence and extent of negative investment in each ownership group: what we term the efficiency (or restructuring) hypothesis, the (lack of) financing hypothesis, and the (slow) growth hypothesis. Our panel data probit estimations shows that negative investment by state-owned firms can be explained mainly by inefficiency: owing to over-investment or mis-investment in the past, these firms have had to restructure and to get rid of obsolete capital in the face of increasing competition and hardening budgets. The financing explanation holds for private firms, which have had to divest in order to raise capital. However, rapid economic growth weighs against both effects in all types of firms, with a larger impact for firms in the private and foreign sectors. A tobit model, estimated to examine the determinants of the amount of negative investment, yields similar conclusions.

Caught Between Theory and Practice: Government, Market, and Regulatory Failure in Electricity Sector Reforms

The world-wide electricity sector reforms of the early 1990s have revealed the considerable complexities of making market driven reforms in network and infrastructure industries. This paper reflects on the experiences to date with the process and outcomes of marketbased electricity reforms across less-developed, transition and developed economies. The reforms outcomes suggest similar problems facing the electricity sector of these countries though their contexts vary significantly. Many developing and developed economies continue to have investment inadequacy concerns and the need to balance economy efficiency, sustainability and social equity after more than two decades of experience with reforms. We also use a case study of selected countries that in many respects represent the current state of the reform though they are rarely examined. Nepal, Belarus and Ireland are chosen as country-specific case studies for this purpose. We conclude that the changing dynamics of the electricity supply industry (ESI) and policy objectives imply that analysing the success and failure of reforms will indeed remain a complex process.

Factors Affecting Audit Quality in the 2007 UK Regulatory Environment: Perceptions of Chief Financial Officers, Audit Committee Chairs and Audit Engagement Partners

In line with global changes, the UK regulatory regime for audit and corporate governance has changed significantly since the Enron scandal, with an increased role for audit committees and independent inspection of audit firms. UK listed company chief financial officers (CFOs), audit committee chairs (ACCs) and audit partners (APs) were surveyed in 2007 to obtain views on the impact of 36 economic and regulatory factors on audit quality. 498 usable responses were received, representing a response rate of 36%. All groups rated various audit committee interactions with auditors among the factors most enhancing audit quality. Exploratory factor analysis reduces the 36 factors to nine uncorrelated dimensions. In order of extraction, these are: economic risk; audit committee activities; risk of regulatory action; audit firm ethics; economic independence of auditor; audit partner rotation; risk of client loss; audit firm size; and, lastly, International Standards on Auditing (ISAs) and audit inspection. In addition to the activities of the audit committee, risk factors for the auditor (both economic and certain regulatory risks) are believed to most enhance audit quality. However, ISAs and the audit inspection regime, aspects of the ‘standards-surveillance compliance’ regulatory system, are viewed as less effective. Respondents commented that aspects of the changed regime are largely process and compliance driven, with high costs for limited benefits, supporting psychological bias regulation theory that claims there is overconfidence that a useful regulatory intervention exists.