Multi-agent contracting with countervailing incentives and limited liability

We consider a principal who deals with a privately informed agent protected by limited liability in a correlated information setting. The agent's technology is such that the fixed cost declines with the marginal cost (the type), so that countervailing incentives may arise. We show that, with high liability, the first-best outcome can be effected for any type if (1) the fixed cost is non-concave in type, under the contract that yields the smallest feasible loss to the agent; (2) the fixed cost is not very concave in type, under the contract that yields the maximum sustainable loss to the agent. We further show that, with low liability, the first-best outcome is still implemented for a non-degenerate range of types if the fixed cost is less concave in type than some given threshold, which tightens as the liability reduces. The optimal contract entails pooling otherwise.

Beyond Intermediates: The Role of Consumption and Commuting in the Construction of Local Input-Output Tables

It is a well-established fact in the literature on simulating Input-Output tables that mechanical methods for estimating intermediate trade lead to biased results where cross-hauling is underestimated and Type-I multipliers are overstated. Repeated findings to this effect have led to a primary emphasis on advocating the accurate estimation of intermediate trade flows. This paper reviews previous research and argues for a qualification of the consensus view: When simulating IO tables, construction approaches need to consider spill-over effects driven by wage and consumption flows. In particular, for the case of metropolitan economies, wage and consumption flows are important if accurate Type-II multipliers are to be obtained. This is demonstrated by constructing an interregional Input-Output table, which captures interdependencies between a city and its commuter belt, nested within the wider regional economy. In addition to identifying interdependencies caused by interregional intermediate purchases, data on subregional household incomes and commuter flows are used to identify interdependencies from wage payments and household consumption. The construction of the table is varied around a range of assumptions on intermediate trade and household consumption to capture the sensitivity of multipliers.