Inequalities in Child Mortality in India: A District-Level Analysis

This paper measures the degree of inequality in child mortality rates across districts in India, using data from the 1981, 1991 and 2001 Indian population censuses. The results show that child mortality is more concentrated in less developed districts in all three census years. Further, between 1981 and 2001, the inequality in child mortality seems to have increased to the advantage of the more developed districts (i.e., there was an increasing concentration of child mortality in less developed districts). However, the inequality in female child mortality rates seems to have declined between 1991 and 2001, even as it increased – albeit at a slower rate than before – for male child mortality rates. In the decomposition analysis, it is found that while a more equitable distribution of medical facilities and safe drinking water across districts did contribute towards reducing inequality in child mortality between 1981 and 1991, different levels of structural change among districts were responsible for a very large part of the inequality in child mortality to the advantage of the more developed districts in all three census years. Other variables which played important roles in increasing inequality included a measure of infrastructure development, female literacy, and a social group status variable. The paper concludes with some brief comments on the policy implications of the findings.

Contagious Illiquidity I: Contagion through Time

This paper is an investigation into the dynamics of asset markets with adverse selection a la Akerlof (1970). The particular question asked is: can market failure at some later date precipitate market failure at an earlier date? The answer is yes: there can be "contagious illiquidity" from the future back to the present. The mechanism works as follows. If the market is expected to break down in the future, then agents holding assets they know to be lemons (assets with low returns) will be forced to hold them for longer - they cannot quickly resell them. As a result, the effective difference in payoff between a lemon and a good asset is greater. But it is known from the static Akerlof model that the greater the payoff differential between lemons and non-lemons, the more likely is the market to break down. Hence market failure in the future is more likely to lead to market failure today. Conversely, if the market is not anticipated to break down in the future, assets can be readily sold and hence an agent discovering that his or her asset is a lemon can quickly jettison it. In effect, there is little difference in payoff between a lemon and a good asset. The logic of the static Akerlof model then runs the other way: the small payoff differential is unlikely to lead to market breakdown today. The conclusion of the paper is that the nature of today's market - liquid or illiquid - hinges critically on the nature of tomorrow's market, which in turn depends on the next day's, and so on. The tail wags the dog.