Revealed cardinal preference

I prove that as long as we allow the marginal utility for money (lambda) to vary between purchases (similarly to the budget) then the quasi-linear and the ordinal budget-constrained models rationalize the same data. However, we know that lambda is approximately constant. I provide a simple constructive proof for the necessary and sufficient condition for the constant lambda rationalization, which I argue should replace the Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preference in empirical studies of consumer behavior. 'Go Cardinals!' It is the minimal requirement of any scientifi c theory that it is consistent with the data it is trying to explain. In the case of (Hicksian) consumer theory it was revealed preference -introduced by Samuelson (1938,1948) - that provided an empirical test to satisfy this need. At that time most of economic reasoning was done in terms of a competitive general equilibrium, a concept abstract enough so that it can be built on the ordinal preferences over baskets of goods - even if the extremely specialized ones of Arrow and Debreu. However, starting in the sixties, economics has moved beyond the 'invisible hand' explanation of how -even competitive- markets operate. A seemingly unavoidable step of this 'revolution' was that ever since, most economic research has been carried out in a partial equilibrium context. Now, the partial equilibrium approach does not mean that the rest of the markets are ignored, rather that they are held constant. In other words, there is a special commodity -call it money - that reflects the trade-offs of moving purchasing power across markets. As a result, the basic building block of consumer behavior in partial equilibrium is no longer the consumer's preferences over goods, rather her valuation of them, in terms of money. This new paradigm necessitates a new theory of revealed preference.

The Effects of Experience on Preference Uncertainty: Theory and Empirics for Public and Quasi-Public Environmental Goods

This paper develop and estimates a model of demand estimation for environmental public goods which allows for consumers to learn about their preferences through consumption experiences. We develop a theoretical model of Bayesian updating, perform comparative statics over the model, and show how the theoretical model can be consistently incorporated into a reduced form econometric model. We then estimate the model using data collected for two environmental goods. We find that the predictions of the theoretical exercise that additional experience makes consumers more certain over their preferences in both mean and variance are supported in each case.

Productivity, Preferences and UIP deviations in an Open Economy Business Cycle Model

We show that a flex-price two-sector open economy DSGE model can explain the poor degree of international risk sharing and exchange rate disconnect. We use a suite of model evaluation measures and examine the role of (i) traded and non-traded sectors; (ii) financial market incompleteness; (iii) preference shocks; (iv) deviations from UIP condition for the exchange rates; and (v) creditor status in net foreign assets. We find that there is a good case for both traded and non-traded productivity shocks as well as UIP deviations in explaining the puzzles.

A Salience Theory of Choice Errors

We study a psychologically based foundation for choice errors. The decision maker applies a preference ranking after forming a 'consideration set' prior to choosing an alternative. Membership of the consideration set is determined both by the alternative specific salience and by the rationality of the agent (his general propensity to consider all alternatives). The model turns out to include a logit formulation as a special case. In general, it has a rich set of implications both for exogenous parameters and for a situation in which alternatives can a¤ect their own salience (salience games). Such implications are relevant to assess the link between 'revealed' preferences and 'true' preferences: for example, less rational agents may paradoxically express their preference through choice more truthfully than more rational agents.

Time Horizons And Smoothing In The Bank Of England’s Reaction Function: The Contrast Between The Standard GMM And Ex Ante Forecast Approaches

The monetary policy reaction function of the Bank of England is estimated by the standard GMM approach and the ex-ante forecast method developed by Goodhart (2005), with particular attention to the horizons for inflation and output at which each approach gives the best fit. The horizons for the ex-ante approach are much closer to what is implied by the Bank’s view of the transmission mechanism, while the GMM approach produces an implausibly slow adjustment of the interest rate, and suffers from a weak instruments problem. These findings suggest a strong preference for the ex-ante approach.

Time Horizons And Smoothing In The Bank Of England’s Reaction Function: The Contrast Between The Standard GMM And Ex Ante Forecast Approaches

The monetary policy reaction function of the Bank of England is estimated by the standard GMM approach and the ex-ante forecast method developed by Goodhart (2005), with particular attention to the horizons for inflation and output at which each approach gives the best fit. The horizons for the ex-ante approach are much closer to what is implied by the Bank’s view of the transmission mechanism, while the GMM approach produces an implausibly slow adjustment of the interest rate, and suffers from a weak instruments problem. These findings suggest a strong preference for the ex-ante approach.

A Framework for Analyzing Language and Welfare

The paper proposes a general model that will encompass trade and social benefits of a common language, a preference for a variety of languages, the fundamental role of translators, an emotional attachment to maternal language, and the threat that globalization poses to the vast majority of languages. With respect to people’s emotional attachment, the model considers minorities to suffer losses from the subordinate status of their language. In addition, the model treats the threat to minority language as coming from the failure of the parents in the minority to transmit their maternal language (durably) to their children. Some familiar results occur. In particular, we encounter the usual social inefficiencies of decentralized solutions to language learning when the sole benefits of the learning are communicative benefits (though translation intervenes). However, these social inefficiencies assume a totally different air when the con-sumer gains of variety are brought in. One fundamental aim of the paper is to bring together contributions to the economics of language from labor economics, network externalities and international trade that are typically treated separately.

A Framework for Analyzing Language and Welfare

The paper proposes a general model that will encompass trade and social benefits of a common language, a preference for a variety of languages, the fundamental role of translators, an emo-tional attachment to maternal language, and the threat that globalization poses to the vast ma-jority of languages. With respect to people’s emotional attachment, the model considers minor-ities to suffer losses from the subordinate status of their language. In addition, the model treats the threat to minority language as coming from the failure of the parents in the minority to transmit their maternal language (durably) to their children. Some familiar results occur. In particular, we encounter the usual social inefficiencies of decentralized solutions to language learning when the sole benefits of the learning are communicative benefits (though translation intervenes). However, these social inefficiencies assume a totally different air when the con-sumer gains of variety are brought in. One fundamental aim of the paper is to bring together contributions to the economics of language from labor economics, network externalities and international trade that are typically treated separately.

A Behavioural Model of Choice in the Presence of Decision Conflict

This paper proposes a model of choice that does not assume completeness of the decision maker’s preferences. The model explains in a natural way, and within a unified framework of choice when preference-incomparable options are present, four behavioural phenomena: the attraction effect, choice deferral, the strengthening of the attraction effect when deferral is per-missible, and status quo bias. The key element in the proposed decision rule is that an individual chooses an alternative from a menu if it is worse than no other alternative in that menu and is also better than at least one. Utility-maximising behaviour is included as a special case when preferences are complete. The relevance of the partial dominance idea underlying the proposed choice procedure is illustrated with an intuitive generalisation of weakly dominated strategies and their iterated deletion in games with vector payoffs.

Stochastic Choice and Consideration Sets

We model a boundedly rational agent who suffers from limited attention. The agent considers each feasible alternative with a given (unobservable) probability, the attention parameter, and then chooses the alternative that maximises a preference relation within the set of considered alternatives. We show that this random choice rule is the only one for which the impact of removing an alternative on the choice probability of any other alternative is asymmetric and menu independent. Both the preference relation and the attention parameters are identi fied uniquely by stochastic choice data.

Two Studies on the Interplay between Social Preferences and Individual Biological Features

Biological features and social preferences have been studied separately as factors influencing human strategic behaviour. We run two studies in order to explore the interplay between these two sets of factors. In the first study, we investigate to what extent social preferences may have some biological underpinnings. We use simple one-shot distribution experiments to attribute subjects one out of four types of social preferences: Self-interested (SI), Competitive (C), Inequality averse (IA) and Efficiency-seeking (ES). We then investigate whether these four groups display differences in their levels of facial Fluctuating Asymmetry (FA) and in proxies for exposure to testosterone during phoetal development and puberty. We observe that development-related biological features and social preferences are relatively independent. In the second study, we compare the relative weight of these two set of factors by studying how they affect subjects’ behaviour in the Ultimatum Game (UG). We find differences in offers made and rejection rates across the four social preference groups. The effect of social preferences is stronger than the effect of biological features even though the latter is significant. We also report a novel link between facial masculinity (a proxy for exposure to testosterone during puberty) and rejection rates in the UG. Our results suggest that biological features influence behaviour both directly and through their relation with the type of social preferences that individuals hold.

Unilateral Emissions Mitigation, Spillovers, and Global Learning

What's the role of unilateral measures in global climate change mitigation in a post-Durban, post 2012 global policy regime? We argue that under conditions of preference heterogeneity, unilateral emissions mitigation at a subnational level may exist even when a nation is unwilling to commit to emission cuts. As the fraction of individuals unilaterally cutting emissions in a global strongly connected network of countries evolves over time, learning the costs of cutting emissions can result in the adoption of such activities globally and we establish that this will indeed happen under certain assumptions. We analyze the features of a policy proposal that could accelerate convergence to a low carbon world in the presence of global learning.

What is the Causal Effect of Information and Learning about a Public Good on Willingness to Pay?

In this study we elicit agents’ prior information set regarding a public good, exogenously give information treatments to survey respondents and subsequently elicit willingness to pay for the good and posterior information sets. The design of this field experiment allows us to perform theoretically motivated hypothesis testing between different updating rules: non-informative updating, Bayesian updating, and incomplete updating. We find causal evidence that agents imperfectly update their information sets. We also field causal evidence that the amount of additional information provided to subjects relative to their pre-existing information levels can affect stated WTP in ways consistent overload from too much learning. This result raises important (though familiar) issues for the use of stated preference methods in policy analysis.

Imperfect Attention and Menu Evaluation

We model the choice behaviour of an agent who suffers from imperfect attention. We define inattention axiomatically through preference over menus and endowed alternatives: an agent is inattentive if it is better to be endowed with an alternative a than to be allowed to pick a from a menu in which a is is the best alternative. This property and vNM rationality on the domain of menus and alternatives imply that the agent notices each alternative with a given menu-dependent probability (attention parameter) and maximises a menu independent utility function over the alternatives he notices. Preference for flexibility restricts the model to menu independent attention parameters as in Manzini and Mariotti [19]. Our theory explains anomalies (e.g. the attraction and compromise effect) that the Random Utility Model cannot accommodate.

Autonomy-enhancing paternalism

We present a form of soft paternalism called "autonomy-enhancing paternalism" that seeks to in-crease individual well-being by facilitating the individual ability to make critically reflected, autonomous decisions. The focus of autonomy-enhancing paternalism is on helping individuals to become better decision-makers, rather than on helping them by making better decisions for them. Autonomy-enhancing paternalism acknowledges that behavioral interventions can change the strength of decision-making anomalies over time, and favors those interventions that improve, rather than reduce, individuals ability to make good and unbiased decisions. By this it prevents manipulation of the individual by the soft paternalist, accounts for the heterogeneity of individuals, and counteracts slippery slope arguments by decreasing the probability of future paternalistic interventions. Moreover, autonomy-enhancing paternalism can be defended based on both liberal values and welfare considerations.