The demand for intensity versus frequency of alcohol consumption: Evidence from rural Australia

This paper develops a theoretical model for the demand of alcohol where intensity and frequency of consumption are separate choices made by individuals in order to maximize their utility. While distinguishing between intensity and frequency of consumption may be unimportant for many goods, this is clearly not the case with alcohol where the likelihood of harm depends not only on the total consumed but also on the pattern of use. The results from the theoretical model are applied to data from rural Australia in order to investigate the factors that affect the patterns of alcohol use for this population group. This research can play an important role in informing policies by identifying those factors which influence preferences for patterns of risky alcohol use and those groups and communities who are most at risk of harm.

Multi-agent contracting with countervailing incentives and limited liability

We consider a principal who deals with a privately informed agent protected by limited liability in a correlated information setting. The agent's technology is such that the fixed cost declines with the marginal cost (the type), so that countervailing incentives may arise. We show that, with high liability, the first-best outcome can be effected for any type if (1) the fixed cost is non-concave in type, under the contract that yields the smallest feasible loss to the agent; (2) the fixed cost is not very concave in type, under the contract that yields the maximum sustainable loss to the agent. We further show that, with low liability, the first-best outcome is still implemented for a non-degenerate range of types if the fixed cost is less concave in type than some given threshold, which tightens as the liability reduces. The optimal contract entails pooling otherwise.