The Relative Efficiency of Automatic and Discretionary Industrial Aid

For the last two decades, the primary instruments for UK regional policy have been discretionary subsidies. Such aid is targeted at “additional” projects - projects that would not have been implemented without the subsidy - and the subsidy should be the minimum necessary for the project to proceed. Discretionary subsidies are thought to be more efficient than automatic subsidies, where many of the aided projects are non-additional and all projects receive the same subsidy rate. The present paper builds on Swales (1995) and Wren (2007a) to compare three subsidy schemes: an automatic scheme and two types of discretionary scheme, one with accurate appraisal and the other with appraisal error. These schemes are assessed on their expected welfare impacts. The particular focus is the reduction in welfare gain imposed by the interaction of appraisal error and the requirements for accountability. This is substantial and difficult to detect with conventional evaluation techniques.

Aid and Development: Issues and Reflections

The paper has three main sections. The first is a review of two particular propositions which appear in Dambisa Moyo’s 2009 book Dead Aid which were not subjected to rigorous analysis in the reviews which appeared following its publication. The finding is that neither proposition survives serious scrutiny – that aid is responsible for most of sub-Saharan Africa’s economic woes and that the international bond market represents a viable alternative to foreign aid for the finance of development-oriented investment. The second questions some of the characteristics and uses of the World Bank’s Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA), particularly focussing on the use of an essentially ordinal measure in cardinal applications. The third subjects the UK Department for International Development’s Needs-Effectiveness Index to critical review, concluding that further consideration of its attributes is necessary.

Decision Errors, Legal Uncertainty and Welfare: a General Treatment

This paper provides a general treatment of the implications for welfare of legal uncertainty. We distinguish legal uncertainty from decision errors: though the former can be influenced by the latter, the latter are neither necessary nor sufficient for the existence of legal uncertainty. We show that an increase in decision errors will always reduce welfare. However, for any given level of decision errors, information structures involving more legal uncertainty can improve welfare. This holds always, even when there is complete legal uncertainty, when sanctions on socially harmful actions are set at their optimal level. This transforms radically one’s perception about the “costs” of legal uncertainty. We also provide general proofs for two results, previously established under restrictive assumptions. The first is that Effects-Based enforcement procedures may welfare dominate Per Se (or object-based) procedures and will always do so when sanctions are optimally set. The second is that optimal sanctions may well be higher under enforcement procedures involving more legal uncertainty.

Legal Uncertainty, Competition Law Enforcement Procedures and Optimal Penalties

In this paper we make three contributions to the literature on optimal Competition Law enforcement procedures. The first (which is of general interest beyond competition policy) is to clarify the concept of “legal uncertainty”, relating it to ideas in the literature on Law and Economics, but formalising the concept through various information structures which specify the probability that each firm attaches – at the time it takes an action – to the possibility of its being deemed anti-competitive were it to be investigated by a Competition Authority. We show that the existence of Type I and Type II decision errors by competition authorities is neither necessary nor sufficient for the existence of legal uncertainty, and that information structures with legal uncertainty can generate higher welfare than information structures with legal certainty – a result echoing a similar finding obtained in a completely different context and under different assumptions in earlier Law and Economics literature (Kaplow and Shavell, 1992). Our second contribution is to revisit and significantly generalise the analysis in our previous paper, Katsoulacos and Ulph (2009), involving a welfare comparison of Per Se and Effects- Based legal standards. In that analysis we considered just a single information structure under an Effects-Based standard and also penalties were exogenously fixed. Here we allow for (a) different information structures under an Effects-Based standard and (b) endogenous penalties. We obtain two main results: (i) considering all information structures a Per Se standard is never better than an Effects-Based standard; (ii) optimal penalties may be higher when there is legal uncertainty than when there is no legal uncertainty.

International Aid to Tanzania – with some comparisons from Ghana and Uganda

This paper has three principal objectives. First, to review the level of Official Development Assistance (ODA) to Tanzania over the last two to three decades, and to place this into an economic context. This review includes some comparisons with the experience of Ghana and Uganda. Second, to discuss three major issues for the Tanzanian aid: the position of ODA as budget support, corruption, and alignment with the principles of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. Third, to review the literature on the Tanzanian aid experience, including a range of official evaluation reports produced by the Tanzanian government and by the donor community. The conclusions, broadly, are that ODA has been at a sustained high level for most of the period reviewed, funding a significant amount of government development expenditure, and that economic growth has been strong, with poverty reduction ‘flat-lining’ in Tanzania but being significant in Ghana and Uganda. Experience with budget support in Tanzania has been mixed, corruption continues as a major concern, and improvements to public finance management have been difficult to achieve. In this context governance adjustments come slowly, requiring patience on the part of both recipient governments and the ODA donor community.