Inter-Connectedness In The Scottish Economy, 1998-2004

The measurement of inter-connectedness in an economy using input-output tables is not new, however much of the previous literature has not had any explicit dynamic dimension. Studies have tried to estimate the degree of inter-relatedness for an economy at a given point in time using one inputoutput table, some have compared different economies at a point in time but few have looked at the question of how inter-connectedness within an economy changes over time. The publication in 2009 of a consistent series of inputoutput tables for Scotland offers the researcher the opportunity to track changes in the degree of inter-connectedness over the seven year period 1998 to 2004. The paper is in two parts. A simple measure of inter-connectedness is introduced in the first part of the paper and applied to the Scottish tables. It is shown that although the aggregate results might appear to indicate a degree of import substitution was taking place this result is not robust to industrial disaggregation. In the second part of the paper an extraction method is applied to an eleven sector disaggregation of the Scottish economy in order to estimate how interconnectedness has changed over time for each industrial sector. It is shown that for the majority of sectors the degree of interconnectedness with the rest of the Scottish economy has grown for others, in particular Financial Services and Energy and Water Supply it has not.

Disaggregating the Household Sector in a 2004 UK Input Output Table and Social Accounting Matrix by Income Quintiles

This paper disaggregates a UK Input-Output (IO) table for 2004 based on household income quintiles from published survey data. In addition to the Input-Output disaggregation, the household components of a UK Income Expenditure (I-E) account used to inform a Social Accounting Matrix (SAM),have also been disaggregated by household income quintile. The focus of this paper is on household expenditure on the UK energy sector.

Firm size and trade secret intensity: evidence from the Economic Espionage Act

This paper considers trade secrecy as an appropriation mechanism in the context ofb the US Economic Espionage Act (EEA) 1996. We examine the relation between trade secret intensity and firm size, using a cross section of 95 court cases. The paper builds on extant work in three respects. First, we create a unique body of evidence, using EEA prosecutions from 1996 to 2008. Second, we use an econometric approach to measurement, estimation and hypothesis testing. This allows us comprehensively to test the robustness of findings. Third, we focus on objectively measured valuations, instead of the subjective, self-reported values used elsewhere. We find a stable, robust value for the elasticity of trade secret intensity with respect to firm size, which indicates that a 10% reduction in firm size leads to a 7% increase in trade secret intensity. We find that this result is not sensitive to industrial sector, sample trimming, or functional form.

Decision Errors, Legal Uncertainty and Welfare: a General Treatment

This paper provides a general treatment of the implications for welfare of legal uncertainty. We distinguish legal uncertainty from decision errors: though the former can be influenced by the latter, the latter are neither necessary nor sufficient for the existence of legal uncertainty. We show that an increase in decision errors will always reduce welfare. However, for any given level of decision errors, information structures involving more legal uncertainty can improve welfare. This holds always, even when there is complete legal uncertainty, when sanctions on socially harmful actions are set at their optimal level. This transforms radically one’s perception about the “costs” of legal uncertainty. We also provide general proofs for two results, previously established under restrictive assumptions. The first is that Effects-Based enforcement procedures may welfare dominate Per Se (or object-based) procedures and will always do so when sanctions are optimally set. The second is that optimal sanctions may well be higher under enforcement procedures involving more legal uncertainty.

Legal Uncertainty, Competition Law Enforcement Procedures and Optimal Penalties

In this paper we make three contributions to the literature on optimal Competition Law enforcement procedures. The first (which is of general interest beyond competition policy) is to clarify the concept of “legal uncertainty”, relating it to ideas in the literature on Law and Economics, but formalising the concept through various information structures which specify the probability that each firm attaches – at the time it takes an action – to the possibility of its being deemed anti-competitive were it to be investigated by a Competition Authority. We show that the existence of Type I and Type II decision errors by competition authorities is neither necessary nor sufficient for the existence of legal uncertainty, and that information structures with legal uncertainty can generate higher welfare than information structures with legal certainty – a result echoing a similar finding obtained in a completely different context and under different assumptions in earlier Law and Economics literature (Kaplow and Shavell, 1992). Our second contribution is to revisit and significantly generalise the analysis in our previous paper, Katsoulacos and Ulph (2009), involving a welfare comparison of Per Se and Effects- Based legal standards. In that analysis we considered just a single information structure under an Effects-Based standard and also penalties were exogenously fixed. Here we allow for (a) different information structures under an Effects-Based standard and (b) endogenous penalties. We obtain two main results: (i) considering all information structures a Per Se standard is never better than an Effects-Based standard; (ii) optimal penalties may be higher when there is legal uncertainty than when there is no legal uncertainty.