An interregional input-output analysis of the pollution content of trade flows and environmental trade balances between five states in the US Mid-West

In this paper we attempt an empirical application of the multi-region input-output (MRIO) method in order to enumerate the pollution content of interregional trade flows between five Mid-West regions/states in the US –Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Michigan and Wisconsin – and the rest of the US. This allows us to analyse some very important issues in terms of the nature and significance of interregional environmental spillovers within the US Mid-West and the existence of pollution ‘trade balances’ between states. Our results raise questions in terms of the extent to which authorities at State level can control local emissions where they are limited in the way some emissions can be controlled, particularly with respect to changes in demand elsewhere in the Mid-West and US. This implies a need for policy co-ordination between national and state level authorities in the US to meet emissions reductions targets. The existence of an environmental trade balances between states also raises issues in terms of net losses/gains in terms of pollutants as a result of interregional trade within the US and whether, if certain activities can be carried out using less polluting technology in one region relative to others, it is better for the US as a whole if this type of relationship exists.

The Timing of Asset Trade and Optimal Policy in Dynamic Open Economies

Using a standard open economy DSGE model, it is shown that the timing of asset trade relative to policy decisions has a potentially important impact on the welfare evaluation of monetary policy at the individual country level. If asset trade in the initial period takes place before the announcement of policy, a national policymaker can choose a policy rule which reduces the work effort of households in the policymaker’s country in the knowledge that consumption is fully insured by optimally chosen international portfolio positions. But if asset trade takes place after the policy announcement, this insurance is absent and households in the policymaker’s country bear the full consumption consequences of the chosen policy rule. The welfare incentives faced by national policymakers are very different between the two cases. Numerical examples confirm that asset market timing has a significant impact on the optimal policy rule.

The Distributional Consequences of Supply-Side Reforms in General Equilibrium

This paper addresses the issue on whether tax reforms consisten with lower public debt-to-GDP in the long-run can lead to a more efficient and equitable economy. To this end we solve a heterogeneous agent model comprised of a government, a representative capitalist and representative skilled and unskilled workers, under both rational expectations and adaptive learning. Our main ndings are that (i) reductions in capital taxation, while bene cial at the aggregate level, lead to increased inequality mainly due to the substitutability of un- skilled labour and capital; (ii) a fall in taxation for skilled labour is Pareto improving, which is largely explained by its complementarity with the other factor inputs; (iii) all agents would prefer increasing the tax rate on capital to increasing the tax rate on skilled and un- skilled labour since it leads to relatively lower welfare losses; and (iv) heterogeneity in initial beliefs under adaptive learning quantitatively matters for welfare.

Accounting for the dead in the longitudinal analysis of income-related health inequalities

This paper develops an accounting framework to consider the effect of deaths on the longitudinal analysis of income-related health inequalities. Ignoring deaths or using inverse probability weights (IPWs) to re-weight the sample for mortality-related attrition can produce misleading results, since to do so would be to disregard the most extreme of all health outcomes. Incorporating deaths into the longitudinal analysis of income-related health inequalities provides a more complete picture in terms of the evaluation of health changes in respect to socioeconomic status. We illustrate our work by investigating health mobility in Quality Adjusted Life Years (QALYs) as measured by the SF6D from 1999 till 2004 using the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS). We show that for Scottish males explicitly accounting for the dead, rather than using IPWs to account for mortality-related attrition, changes the direction of the relationship between relative health changes and initial income position, while for other population groups it increases the strength of this relationship by up to 14 times. When deaths are explicitly incorporated into the analysis it is found that over this five year period for both Scotland and England & Wales the relative health changes were significantly regressive such that the poor experienced a larger share of the health losses relative to their initial share of health and a large amount of this was related to mortality.

Optimism and commitment: An elementary theory of bargaining and war

We propose an elementary theory of wars fought by fully rational contenders. Two parties play a Markov game that combines stages of bargaining with stages where one side has the ability to impose surrender on the other. Under uncertainty and incomplete information, in the unique equilibrium of the game, long confrontations occur: war arises when reality disappoints initial (rational) optimism, and it persist longer when both agents are optimists but reality proves both wrong. Bargaining proposals that are rejected initially might eventually be accepted after several periods of confrontation. We provide an explicit computation of the equilibrium, evaluating the probability of war, and its expected losses as a function of i) the costs of confrontation, ii) the asymmetry of the split imposed under surrender, and iii) the strengths of contenders at attack and defense. Changes in these parameters display non-monotonic effects.

The distributional consequences of tax reforms under market distortions

In this paper we examine the importance of imperfect competition in product and labour markets in determining the long-run welfare e¤ects of tax reforms assuming agent heterogeneneity in capital hold- ings. Each of these market failures, independently, results in welfare losses for at least a segment of the population, after a capital tax cut and a concurrent labour tax increase. However, when combined in a realistic calibration to the UK economy, they imply that a capital tax cut will be Pareto improving in the long run. Consistent with the the- ory of second-best, the two distortions in this context work to correct the negative distributional e¤ects of a capital tax cut that each one, on its own, creates.

Payoff levels, loss avoidance, and equilibrium selection in the Stag Hunt: an experimental study

Game theorists typically assume that changing a game’s payoff levels—by adding the same constant to, or subtracting it from, all payoffs—should not affect behavior. While this invariance is an implication of the theory when payoffs mirror expected utilities, it is an empirical question when the “payoffs” are actually money amounts. In particular, if individuals treat monetary gains and losses differently, then payoff–level changes may matter when they result in positive payoffs becoming negative, or vice versa. We report the results of a human–subjects experiment designed to test for two types of loss avoidance: certain–loss avoidance (avoiding a strategy leading to a sure loss, in favor of an alternative that might lead to a gain) and possible–loss avoidance (avoiding a strategy leading to a possible loss, in favor of an alternative that leads to a sure gain). Subjects in the experiment play three versions of Stag Hunt, which are identical up to the level of payoffs, under a variety of treatments. We find differences in behavior across the three versions of Stag Hunt; these differences are hard to detect in the first round of play, but grow over time. When significant, the differences we find are in the direction predicted by certain– and possible–loss avoidance. Our results carry implications for games with multiple equilibria, and for theories that attempt to select among equilibria in such games.

A Framework for Analyzing Language and Welfare

The paper proposes a general model that will encompass trade and social benefits of a common language, a preference for a variety of languages, the fundamental role of translators, an emotional attachment to maternal language, and the threat that globalization poses to the vast majority of languages. With respect to people’s emotional attachment, the model considers minorities to suffer losses from the subordinate status of their language. In addition, the model treats the threat to minority language as coming from the failure of the parents in the minority to transmit their maternal language (durably) to their children. Some familiar results occur. In particular, we encounter the usual social inefficiencies of decentralized solutions to language learning when the sole benefits of the learning are communicative benefits (though translation intervenes). However, these social inefficiencies assume a totally different air when the con-sumer gains of variety are brought in. One fundamental aim of the paper is to bring together contributions to the economics of language from labor economics, network externalities and international trade that are typically treated separately.

A Framework for Analyzing Language and Welfare

The paper proposes a general model that will encompass trade and social benefits of a common language, a preference for a variety of languages, the fundamental role of translators, an emo-tional attachment to maternal language, and the threat that globalization poses to the vast ma-jority of languages. With respect to people’s emotional attachment, the model considers minor-ities to suffer losses from the subordinate status of their language. In addition, the model treats the threat to minority language as coming from the failure of the parents in the minority to transmit their maternal language (durably) to their children. Some familiar results occur. In particular, we encounter the usual social inefficiencies of decentralized solutions to language learning when the sole benefits of the learning are communicative benefits (though translation intervenes). However, these social inefficiencies assume a totally different air when the con-sumer gains of variety are brought in. One fundamental aim of the paper is to bring together contributions to the economics of language from labor economics, network externalities and international trade that are typically treated separately.

Cyclical and Welfare Effects of Public Sector Unions in a Real-Business-Cycle Model

Motivated by the highly-unionized public sectors, the high public shares in total employment, and the public sector wage premia observed in Europe, this paper examines the importance of public sector unions for macroeconomic theory. The model generates cyclical behavior in hours and wages that is consistent with data behavior in an economy with highly-unionized public sector, namely Germany during the period 1970-2007. The union model is a signifi cant improvement over a model with exogenous public employment. In addition, endogenously-determined public wage and hours add to the distortionary e ffect of contractionary tax reforms by generating greater tax rate changes, thus producing signi ficantly higher welfare losses.

On the cost of rent-seeking by government bureaucrats in a Real-Business-Cycle framework

This paper studies the wasteful e ffect of bureaucracy on the economy by addressing the link between rent-seeking behavior of government bureaucrats and the public sector wage bill, which is taken to represent the rent component. In particular, public o fficials are modeled as individuals competing for a larger share of those public funds. The rent-seeking extraction technology in the government administration is modeled as in Murphy et al. (1991) and incorporated in an otherwise standard Real-Business-Cycle (RBC) framework with public sector. The model is calibrated to German data for the period 1970-2007. The main fi ndings are: (i) Due to the existence of a signi ficant public sector wage premium and the high public sector employment, a substantial amount of working time is spent rent-seeking, which in turn leads to signifi cant losses in terms of output; (ii) The measures for the rent-seeking cost obtained from the model for the major EU countries are highly-correlated to indices of bureaucratic ineffi ciency; (iii) Under the optimal scal policy regime,steady-state rent-seeking is smaller relative to the exogenous policy case, as the government chooses a higher public wage premium, but sets a much lower public employment, thus achieving a decrease in rent-seeking.

Liquidity, moral hazard and bank crises

Bank crises, by interrupting liquidity provision, have been viewed as resulting in welfare losses. In a model of banking with moral hazard, we show that second best bank contracts that improve on autarky ex ante require costly crises to occur with positive probability at the interim stage. When bank payoffs are partially appropriable, either directly via imposition of fines or indirectly by the use of bank equity as a collateral, we argue that an appropriately designed ex-ante regime of policy intervention involving conditional monitoring can prevent bank crises.

Delay and Haircuts in Sovereign Debt: Recovery and Sustainability

One of the striking aspects of recent sovereign debt restructurings is, conditional on default, delay length is positively correlated with the size of "haircut", which is size of creditor losses. In this paper, we develop an incomplete information model of debt restructuring where the prospect of uncertain economic recovery and the signalling about sustainability concerns together generate multi-period delay. The results from our analysis show that there is a correlation between delay length and size of haircut. Such results are supported by evidence. We show that Pareto ranking of equilibria, conditional on default, can be altered once we take into account the ex ante incentive of sovereign debtor. We use our results to evaluate proposals advocated to ensure orderly resolution of sovereign debt crises.