On Public Inefficiencies in a Mixed Duopoly

The aim of this paper is to investigate the welfare effect of a change in the public firms objective function in oligopoly when the government takes into account the distortionary effect of rising funds by taxation (shadow cost of public funds). We analyze the impact of a shift from welfare- to profit-maximizing behaviour of the public firm on the timing of competition by endogenizing the determination of simultaneous (Nash-Cournot) versus sequential (Stackelberg) games using the game with observable delay proposed by Hamilton and Slutsky (1990). Differently from previous work that assumed the timing of competition, we show that, absent efficiency gains, instructing the public firm to play as a private one never increases welfare. Moreover, even when large efficiency gains result from the shift in public firm's objective, an inefficient public firm that maximizes welfare may be preferred.

Delay and Haircuts in Sovereign Debt: Recovery and Sustainability

One of the striking aspects of recent sovereign debt restructurings is, conditional on default, delay length is positively correlated with the size of haircut. In this paper, we develop an incomplete information model of debt restructuring where the prospect of uncertain economic recovery and the signalling about sustainability concerns together generate multi-period delay. The results from our analysis show that there is a correlation between delay length and size of haircut. Such results are supported by evidence. We show that Pareto ranking of equilibria, conditional on default, can be altered once we take into account the ex ante incentive of sovereign debtor. We use our results to evaluate proposals advocated to ensure orderly resolution of sovereign debt crises.

Delay and Haircuts in Sovereign Debt: Recovery and Sustainability

One of the striking aspects of recent sovereign debt restructurings is, conditional on default, delay length is positively correlated with the size of "haircut", which is size of creditor losses. In this paper, we develop an incomplete information model of debt restructuring where the prospect of uncertain economic recovery and the signalling about sustainability concerns together generate multi-period delay. The results from our analysis show that there is a correlation between delay length and size of haircut. Such results are supported by evidence. We show that Pareto ranking of equilibria, conditional on default, can be altered once we take into account the ex ante incentive of sovereign debtor. We use our results to evaluate proposals advocated to ensure orderly resolution of sovereign debt crises.

The regional electricity generation mix in Scotland: A portfolio selection approach

Standalone levelised cost assessments of electricity supply options miss an important contribution that renewable and non-fossil fuel technologies can make to the electricity portfolio: that of reducing the variability of electricity costs, and their potentially damaging impact upon economic activity. Portfolio theory applications to the electricity generation mix have shown that renewable technologies, their costs being largely uncorrelated with non-renewable technologies, can offer such benefits. We look at the existing Scottish generation mix and examine drivers of changes out to 2020. We assess recent scenarios for the Scottish generation mix in 2020 against mean-variance efficient portfolios of electricity-generating technologies. Each of the scenarios studied implies a portfolio cost of electricity that is between 22% and 38% higher than the portfolio cost of electricity in 2007. These scenarios prove to be “inefficient” in the sense that, for example, lower variance portfolios can be obtained without increasing portfolio costs, typically by expanding the share of renewables. As part of extensive sensitivity analysis, we find that Wave and Tidal technologies can contribute to lower risk electricity portfolios, while not increasing portfolio cost.

Volatility of Housing

The aim of the project is to develop a theoretical framework where homelessness arises due to various economic and social factors that vary over time. The ultimate goal is i) to understand whether homelessness spells, entrances and exits could be predicted and if so what information is necessary; and ii) to design and evaluate a homelessness prevention programme in a changing and uncertain environment. Examples of the questions we want to answer are: Should it be made easier for people to borrow money so that they can get out of homelessness, or will such borrowing allow people to over-consume today and so fall into homelessness tomorrow? Should precautionary savings be encouraged so that people have cushions to withstand future shocks, or will savings just delay entry into homelessness? What interventions will affect the probability of becoming homeless and how will they affect behaviour? How will interventions affect incentives to save and to consume before homelessness prevention programmes kick in?

A labor market with targeted wage offers

We model a market for highly skilled workers, such as the academic job market. The outputs of firm-worker matches are heterogeneous and common knowledge. Wage setting is synchronous with search: firms simultaneously make one personalized o¤er each to the worker of their choice. With large frictions (delay costs), efficient coordination is not possible, but for small frictions efficient matching with Diamond-type monopsony wages is an equilibrium.

When to Quit Under Uncertainty? A real options approach to smoking cessation

This paper models the decision to quit smoking like an investment decision where the quitter incurs a sunk withdrawal cost today and forgoes their consumer surplus from cigarettes (invests) and hopes to reap an uncertain reward of better health and therefore higher utility in the future (return). We show that a risk-averse mature smoker who expects to benefit from quitting may still rationally choose to delay quitting until they are more confident that quitting is the right decision for them. Such a decision by the smoker is due to the value associated with keeping their option of whether or not to quit open as they learn more about the damage that smoking will have on their future utility. Policies which reduce a smoker’s uncertainty about the damage that smoking with have on their future utility is likely to make them quit earlier.

Development Accounting with Intermediate Goods

Do intermediate goods help explain relative and aggregate productivity differences across countries? Three observations suggest they do: (i) intermediates are relatively expensive in poor countries; (ii) goods industries demand intermediates more intensively than service industries; (iii) goods industries are more prominent intermediate suppliers in poor countries. I build a standard multi-sector growth model accommodating these features to show that inefficient intermediate production strongly depresses aggregate labor productivity and increases the price ratio of final goods to services. Applying the model to data, low and high income countries in fact reveal similar relative efficiency levels between goods and services despite clear differences in relative sectoral labor productivity. Moreover, the main empirical exercise suggests that poorer countries are substantially less efficient at producing intermediate relative to final goods and services. Closing the cross-country efficiency gap in intermediate input production would strongly narrow the aggregate labor productivity difference across countries as well as turn final goods in poorer countries relatively cheap compared to services.

Spatial Takeoff in the First Industrial Revolution

Using the framework of Desmet and Rossi-Hansberg (forthcoming), we present a model of spatial takeoff that is calibrated using spatially-disaggregated occupational data for England in c.1710. The model predicts changes in the spatial distribution of agricultural and manufacturing employment which match data for c.1817 and 1861. The model also matches a number of aggregate changes that characterise the first industrial revolution. Using counterfactual geographical distributions, we show that the initial concentration of productivity can matter for whether and when an industrial takeoff occurs. Subsidies to innovation in either sector can bring forward the date of takeoff while subsidies to the use of land by manufacturing firms can significantly delay a takeoff because it decreases spatial concentration of activity.

Spatial Takeoff in the First Industrial Revolution

Using the framework of Desmet and Rossi-Hansberg (forthcoming), we present a model of spatial takeoff that is calibrated using spatially-disaggregated occupational data for England in c.1710. The model predicts changes in the spatial distribution of agricultural and manufacturing employment which match data for c.1817 and 1861. The model also matches a number of aggregate changes that characterise the first industrial revolution. Using counterfactual geographical distributions, we show that the initial concentration of productivity can matter for whether and when an industrial takeoff occurs. Subsidies to innovation in either sector can bring forward the date of takeoff while subsidies to the use of land by manufacturing firms can significantly delay a takeoff because it decreases spatial concentration of activity.

The Impact of Information Provision on Agglomeration Bonus Performance: An Experimental Study on Local Networks

The Agglomeration Bonus (AB) is a mechanism to induce adjacent landowners to spatially coordinate their land use for the delivery of ecosystem services from farmland. This paper uses laboratory experiments to explore the performance of the AB in achieving the socially optimal land management configuration in a local network environment where the information available to subjects varies. The AB poses a coordination problem between two Nash equilibria: a Pareto dominant and a risk dominant equilibrium. The experiments indicate that if subjects are informed about both their direct and indirect neighbors’ actions, they are more likely to coordinate on the Pareto dominant equilibrium relative to the case where subjects have information about their direct neighbors’ action only. However, the extra information can only delay – and not prevent – the transition to the socially inferior risk dominant Nash equilibrium. In the long run, the AB mechanism may only be partially effective in enhancing delivery of ecosystem services on farming landscapes featuring local networks.

Money Cycles

Operating overheads are widespread and lead to concentrated bursts of activity. To transfer resources between active and idle spells, agents demand financial assets. Futures contracts and lotteries are unsuitable, as they have substantial overheads of their own.We show that money – under efficient monetary policy – is a liquid asset that leads to efficient allocations. Under all other policies, agents follow inefficient “money cycle” patterns of saving, activity, and inactivity. Agents spend their money too quickly – a “hot potato effect of inflation”. We show that inflation can stimulate inefficiently high aggregate output.