Threshold Effects of Dismissal Protection Regulation and the Emergence of Temporary Work Agencies

Labour market regulations aimed at enhancing job-security are dominant in several OECD countries. These regulations seek to reduce dismissals of workers and fluctuations in employment. The main theoretical contribution is to gauge the effects of such regulations on labour demand across establishment sizes. In order to achieve this, we investigate an optimising model of labour demand under uncertainty through the application of real option theory. We also consider other forms of employment which increase the flexibility of the labour market. In particular, we are modelling the contribution of temporary employment agencies (Zeitarbeit) allowing for quick personnel adjustments in client firms. The calibration results indicate that labour market rigidities may be crucial for understanding sluggishness in firms´ labour demand and the emergence and growth of temporary work.

China´s new labour contract law: no harm to employment?

In January 2008, China imposed a new labour contract law. This new law is the most significant reform to the law of employment relations in mainland China in more than a decade. The paper provides a theoretical framework on the inter-linkages between labour market regulation, option value and the choice and timing of employment. All in all, the paper demonstrates that the Labour Contract Law in it´s own right will have only small impacts upon employment in the fast-growing Chinese economy. On the contrary, induced increasing unit labour costs represent the real issue and may reduce employment.

The regional employment impacts of renewable energy expenditures: The case for modelling

One aspect of the case for policy support for renewable energy developments is the wider economic benefits that are expected to be generated. Within Scotland, as with other regions of the UK, there is a focus on encouraging domestically‐based renewable technologies. In this paper, we use a regional computable general equilibrium framework to model the impact on the Scottish economy of expenditures relating to marine energy installations. The results illustrate the potential for (considerable) ‘legacy’ effects after expenditures cease. In identifying the specific sectoral expenditures with the largest impact on (lifetime) regional employment, this approach offers important policy guidance.

The regional employment impacts of renewable energy expenditures: The case for modelling

One aspect of the case for policy support for renewable energy developments is the wider economic benefits that are expected to be generated. Within Scotland, as with other regions of the UK, there is a focus on encouraging domestically‐based renewable technologies. In this paper, we use a regional computable general equilibrium framework to model the impact on the Scottish economy of expenditures relating to marine energy installations. The results illustrate the potential for (considerable) ‘legacy’ effects after expenditures cease. In identifying the specific sectoral expenditures with the largest impact on (lifetime) regional employment, this approach offers important policy guidance.

Employment Protection, Flexibility and Firms’ Strategic Location Decisions under Uncertainty

We construct a model in which oligopolistic firms decide between locating in a country where employment protection implies costly output adjustments and in one without employment protection. Using a two-period three-stage game with uncertainty, we demonstrate that location is influenced by both flexibility and strategic concerns. The strategic effects under Cournot work towards domestic anchorage in the country with employment protection while those under Bertrand do not. Strategic agglomeration can occur in the inflexible country under Cournot and even under Bertrand, provided uncertainty and foreign direct investment costs are low.

Unemployment Risk and Wage Differentials

Workers in less secure jobs are often paid less than identical-looking workers in more secure jobs. We show that this lack of compensating differentials for unemployment risk can arise in equilibrium when all workers are identical and firms differ only in job security (i.e. the probability that the worker is not sent into unemployment). In a setting where workers search for new positions both on and off the job, the worker's marginal willingness to pay for job security is endogenous: it depends on the behavior of all firms in the labor market and increases with the rent the employing firm leaves to the worker. We solve for the labor market equilibrium, finding that wages increase with job security for at least all firms in the risky tail of the distribution of firm-level unemployment risk. Meanwhile, unemployment becomes persistent for low-wage and unemployed workers, a seeming pattern of 'unemployment scarring' created entirely by firm heterogeneity. Higher in the wage distribution, workers can take wage cuts to move to more stable employment.

On the real effects of financial pressure: Evidence from euro area firm-level employment during the recent financial crisis.

Using a large panel of unquoted euro-area firms over the period 2003-11, this paper examines the impact of financial pressure on firms’ employment. The analysis finds evidence that financial pressure negatively affects firms’ employment decisions. This effect is stronger during the 2007-2009 financial crisis, especially for firms in the periphery area compared to their counterparts in the core European economies. We also find that impact of financial pressure on employment is more potent for firms classified as financially constrained and operating in periphery economies during the financial crisis.

Unemployment Risk and Wage Differentials

Workers in less-secure jobs are often paid less than identical-looking workers in more secure jobs. We show that this lack of compensating differentials for unemployment risk can arise in equilibrium when all workers are identical and firms differ only in job security (i.e. the probability that the worker is not sent into unemployment). In a setting where workers search for new positions both on and off the job, the worker’s marginal willingness to pay for job security is endogenous, increasing with the rent received by a worker in his job, and depending on the behavior of all firms in the labor market. We solve for the labor market equilibrium and find that wages increase with job security for at least all firms in the risky tail of the distribution of firm-level unemployment risk. Unemployment becomes persistent for low-wage and unemployed workers, a seeming pattern of ‘unemployment scarring’ created entirely by firm heterogeneity. Higher in the wage distribution, workers can take wage cuts to move to more stable employment.

Is Graduate Under-employment Persistent? Evidence from the United Kingdom

This paper examines the persistence of under-employment amongst UK higher education graduates. For the cohort of individuals who graduated in 2002/3, micro-data collected by the Higher Education Statistical Agency, are used to calculate the rates of "non-graduate job" employment 6 months and 42 months after graduation. A logic regression analysis suggests the underemployment is not a short-term phenomenon and is systematically related to a set of observable characteristics. It is also found that under-employment 42 months after graduation, which is consistent with the view that the nature of the first job after graduation is important in terms of occupational attainment later in the life-cycle.