An interregional input-output analysis of the pollution content of trade flows and environmental trade balances between five states in the US Mid-West

In this paper we attempt an empirical application of the multi-region input-output (MRIO) method in order to enumerate the pollution content of interregional trade flows between five Mid-West regions/states in the US –Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Michigan and Wisconsin – and the rest of the US. This allows us to analyse some very important issues in terms of the nature and significance of interregional environmental spillovers within the US Mid-West and the existence of pollution ‘trade balances’ between states. Our results raise questions in terms of the extent to which authorities at State level can control local emissions where they are limited in the way some emissions can be controlled, particularly with respect to changes in demand elsewhere in the Mid-West and US. This implies a need for policy co-ordination between national and state level authorities in the US to meet emissions reductions targets. The existence of an environmental trade balances between states also raises issues in terms of net losses/gains in terms of pollutants as a result of interregional trade within the US and whether, if certain activities can be carried out using less polluting technology in one region relative to others, it is better for the US as a whole if this type of relationship exists.

On Cobb-Douglas Preferences in Bilateral Oligopoly

Bilateral oligopoly is a simple model of exchange in which a finite set of sellers seek to exchange the goods they are endowed with for money with a finite set of buyers, and no price-taking assumptions are imposed. If trade takes place via a strategic market game bilateral oligopoly can be thought of as two linked proportional-sharing contests: in one the sellers share the aggregate bid from the buyers in proportion to their supply and in the other the buyers share the aggregate supply in proportion to their bids. The analysis can be separated into two ‘partial games’. First, fix the aggregate bid at B; in the first partial game the sellers contest this fixed prize in proportion to their supply and the aggregate supply in the equilibrium of this game is X˜ (B). Next, fix the aggregate supply at X; in the second partial game the buyers contest this fixed prize in proportion to their bids and the aggregate bid in the equilibrium of this game is ˜B (X). The analysis of these two partial games takes into account competition within each side of the market. Equilibrium in bilateral oligopoly must take into account competition between sellers and buyers and requires, for example, ˜B (X˜ (B)) = B. When all traders have Cobb-Douglas preferences ˜ X(B) does not depend on B and ˜B (X) does not depend on X: whilst there is competition within each side of the market there is no strategic interdependence between the sides of the market. The Cobb-Douglas assumption provides a tractable framework in which to explore the features of fully strategic trade but it misses perhaps the most interesting feature of bilateral oligopoly, the implications of which are investigated.