An Inquiry Into The Theory, Causes And Consequences Of Monitoring Indicators Of Health And Safety At Work

This paper engages in an interdisciplinary survey of the current state of knowledge related to the theory, determinants and consequences of occupational safety and health (OSH). First, it synthesizes the available theoretical frameworks used by economists and psychologists to understand the issues related to the optimal provision of OSH in the labour market. Second, it reviews the academic literature investigating the correlates of a comprehensive set of OSH indicators, which portray the state of OSH infrastructure (social security expenditure, prevention, regulations), inputs (chemical and physical agents, ergonomics, working time, violence) and outcomes (injuries, illnesses, absenteeism, job satisfaction) within workplaces. Third, it explores the implications of the lack of OSH in terms of the economic and social costs that are entailed. Finally, the survey identifies areas of future research interests and suggests priorities for policy initiatives that can improve the health and safety of workers.

Saving and Re-building Lives: an Analysis of the Determinants of Disaster Relief

We analyse both theoretically and empirically, the factors that influence the amount of humanitarian aid which countries receive when they are struck by natural disasters. Our investigation particularly distinguishes between immediate disaster relief which helps the survival of victims and long term humanitarian aid given towards reconstruction and rehabilitation. The theoretical model is able to make predictions as well as explain some of the peculiarities in the empirical results. The empirical analysis, making use of some useful data sources, show that both short and long term humanitarian aid increase with number of people killed, financial loss and level of corruption, while GDP per capita has no effect. Number of people affected had no effect on short term aid, but significantly increased long term aid. Both types of aid increased if the natural disaster was an earthquake, tsunami or drought. In addition, short term aid increases in response to a flood while long term aid increases in response to storms.

The Spillover Effects of Monitoring: A Field Experiment.

We provide field experimental evidence of the effects of monitoring in a context where productivity is multi-dimensional and only one dimension is monitored and incentivised. We hire students to do a job for us. The job consists of identifying euro coins. We study the effects of monitoring and penalising mistakes on work quality, and evaluate spillovers on non- incentivised dimensions of productivity (punctuality and theft). We .nd that monitoring improves work quality only if incentives are large, but reduces punctuality substantially irrespectively of the size of incentives. Monitoring does not affect theft, with ten per cent of participants stealing overall. Our setting also allows us to disentangle between possible theoretical mechanisms driving the adverse effects of monitoring. Our .ndings are supportive of a reciprocity mechanism, whereby workers retaliate for being distrusted.