Rebound and disinvestment effects in oil consumption and supply resulting from an increase in energy efficiency in the Scottish commercial transport sector

In this paper we use an energy-economy-environment computable general equilibrium (CGE) model of the Scottish economy to examine the impacts of an exogenous increase in energy augmenting technological progress in the domestic commercial Transport sector on the supply and use of energy. We focus our analysis on oil, as the main type of energy input used in commercial transport activity. We find that a 5% increase in energy efficiency in the commercial Transport sector leads to rebound effects in the use of oil-based energy commodities in all time periods, in the target sector and at the economy-wide level. However, our results also suggest that such an efficiency improvement may cause a contraction in capacity in the Scottish oil supply sector. This ‘disinvestment effect’ acts as a constraint on the size of rebound effects. However, the magnitude of rebound effects and presence of the disinvestment effect in the simulations conducted here are sensitive to the specification of key elasticities of substitution in the nested production function for the target sector, particularly the substitutability of energy for non-energy intermediate inputs to production.

Minu, Startu and all that:- Pitfalls in estimating the sensitivity of a worker’s wage to aggregate unemployment

In this paper we show that the inclusion of unemployment-tenure interaction variates in Mincer wage equations is subject to serious pitfalls. These variates were designed to test whether or not the sensitivity to the business cycle of a worker’s wage varies according to her tenure. We show that three canonical variates used in the literature - the minimum unemployment rate during a worker’s time at the firm(min u), the unemployment rate at the start of her tenure(Su) and the current unemployment rate interacted with a new hire dummy(δu) - can all be significant and "correctly" signed even when each worker in the firm receives the same wage, regardless of tenure (equal treatment). In matched data the problem can be resolved by the inclusion in the panel of firm-year interaction dummies. In unmatched data where this is not possible, we propose a solution for min u and Su based on Solon, Barsky and Parker’s(1994) two step method. This method is sub-optimal because it ignores a large amount of cross tenure variation in average wages and is only valid when the scaled covariances of firm wages and firm employment are acyclical. Unfortunately δu cannot be identified in unmatched data because a differential wage response to unemployment of new hires and incumbents will appear under both equal treatment and unequal treatment.