Electoral Uncertainty and the Deficit Bias in a New Keynesian Economy

Recent attempts to incorporate optimal fiscal policy into New Keynesian models subject to nominal inertia, have tended to assume that policy makers are benevolent and have access to a commitment technology. A separate literature, on the New Political Economy, has focused on real economies where there is strategic use of policy instruments in a world of political conflict. In this paper we combine these literatures and assume that policy is set in a New Keynesian economy by one of two policy makers facing electoral uncertainty (in terms of infrequent elections and an endogenous voting mechanism). The policy makers generally share the social welfare function, but differ in their preferences over fiscal expenditure (in its size and/or composition). Given the environment, policy shall be realistically constrained to be time-consistent. In a sticky-price economy, such heterogeneity gives rise to the possibility of one policy maker utilising (nominal) debt strategically to tie the hands of the other party, and influence the outcome of any future elections. This can give rise to a deficit bias, implying a sub-optimally high level of steady-state debt, and can also imply a sub-optimal response to shocks. The steady-state distortions and inflation bias this generates, combined with the volatility induced by the electoral cycle in a sticky-price environment, can significantly

Balanced Budget Government Spending in a Small Open Regional Economy

This paper investigates the impact of a balanced budget fiscal policy expansion in a regional context within a numerical dynamic general equilibrium model. We take Scotland as an example where, recently, there has been extensive debate on greater fiscal autonomy. In response to a balanced budget fiscal expansion the model suggests that: an increase in current government purchase in goods and services has negative multiplier effects only if the elasticity of substitution between private and public consumption is high enough to move downward the marginal utility of private consumers; public capital expenditure crowds in consumption and investment even with a high level of congestion; but crowding out effects might arise in the short-run if agents are myopic.

International Aid to Tanzania – with some comparisons from Ghana and Uganda

This paper has three principal objectives. First, to review the level of Official Development Assistance (ODA) to Tanzania over the last two to three decades, and to place this into an economic context. This review includes some comparisons with the experience of Ghana and Uganda. Second, to discuss three major issues for the Tanzanian aid: the position of ODA as budget support, corruption, and alignment with the principles of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. Third, to review the literature on the Tanzanian aid experience, including a range of official evaluation reports produced by the Tanzanian government and by the donor community. The conclusions, broadly, are that ODA has been at a sustained high level for most of the period reviewed, funding a significant amount of government development expenditure, and that economic growth has been strong, with poverty reduction ‘flat-lining’ in Tanzania but being significant in Ghana and Uganda. Experience with budget support in Tanzania has been mixed, corruption continues as a major concern, and improvements to public finance management have been difficult to achieve. In this context governance adjustments come slowly, requiring patience on the part of both recipient governments and the ODA donor community.