Intra-Group Competition and Inter-Group Conflict: An Application to Northern Ireland

This paper reviews four economic theories of leadership selection in conflictual settings. The first of these by Cukierman and Tomassi (1998) labeled the ‘information rationale’, argues that hawks may actually be necessary to initiate peace agreements. The second labeled the ‘bargaining rationale’ borrowing from Hamlin and Jennings (2007) agrees with the conventional wisdom that doves are more likely to secure peace, but post-conflict there are good reasons for hawks to be rationally selected. The third found in Jennings and Roelfsema (2008) is labeled the social psychological rationale. This captures the idea of a competition over which group can form the strongest identity, so can apply to group choices which do not impinge upon bargaining power. As in the bargaining rationale, dove selection can be predicted during conflict, but hawk selection post-conflict. Finally, the expressive rationale is discussed which predicts that regardless of the underlying structure of the game (informational, bargaining, psychological) the large group nature of decision-making by making individual decision makers non-decisive in determining the outcome of elections may cause them to make choices based primarily on emotions which may be invariant with the mode of group interaction, be it conflictual or peaceful. Finally, the paper analyses the extent to which the theories can throw light on Northern Ireland electoral history over the last 25 years.

Industrial Structure, Trade and Regional Economics : Market Segmentation

We consider a general equilibrium model a la Bhaskar (Review of Economic Studies 2002): there are complementarities across sectors, each of which comprise (many) heterogenous monopolistically competitive firms. Bhaskar's model is extended in two directions: production requires capital, and labour markets are segmented. Labour market segmentation models the difficulties of labour migrating across international barriers (in a trade context) or from a poor region to a richer one (in a regional context), whilst the assumption of a single capital market means that capital flows freely between countries or regions. The model is solved analytically and a closed form solution is provided. Adding labour market segmentation to Bhaskar's two-tier industrial structure allows us to study, inter alia, the impact of competition regulations on wages and - financial flows both in the regional and international context, and the output, welfare and financial implications of relaxing immigration laws. The analytical approach adopted allows us, not only to sign the effect of policies, but also to quantify their effects. Introducing capital as a factor of production improves the realism of the model and refi nes its empirically testable implications.

My Group Beats Your Group: Evaluating Non-Income Inequalities

This paper proposes a new methodology, the Domination Index, to evaluate non-income inequalities between social groups such as inequalities of educational attainment, occupational status, health or subjective well-being. The Domination Index does not require specific cardinalisation assumptions, but only uses the ordinal structure of these non-income variables. We approach from an axiomatic perspective and show that a set of desirable properties for a group inequality measure when the variable of interest is ordinal, characterizes the Domination Index up to a positive scalar transformation. Moreover we make use of the Domination Index to explore the relation between inequality and segregation and show how these two concepts are related theoretically.

Income stratification and between-group inequality

The paper demonstrates that the ratio of the Yitzhaki (1994) to the conventional measure of between-group inequality is in general equal to one minus twice the weighted average probability that a random member of a richer (on average) group is poorer than a random member of a poorer (on average) group, and may therefore be interpreted as an index of stratification in its own right.