18 resultados para Global Financial Crisis, 2008-...
em Scottish Institute for Research in Economics (SIRE) (SIRE), United Kingdom
Resumo:
This paper develops a structured dynamic factor model for the spreads between London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) and overnight index swap (OIS) rates for a panel of banks. Our model involves latent factors which reflect liquidity and credit risk. Our empirical results show that surges in the short term LIBOR-OIS spreads during the 2007-2009 fi nancial crisis were largely driven by liquidity risk. However, credit risk played a more signifi cant role in the longer term (twelve-month) LIBOR-OIS spread. The liquidity risk factors are more volatile than the credit risk factor. Most of the familiar events in the financial crisis are linked more to movements in liquidity risk than credit risk.
Resumo:
This study examines the impact of macro-liquidity shocks on the returns of UK stock portfolios sorted on the basis of a series of micro-liquidity measures. The macro-liquidity shocks are extracted on the meeting days of the Bank of England Monetary Policy Committee relative to market expectations embedded in futures contracts on the 3-month LIBOR during the period June 1999- December 2009. We report definitive evidence that these shocks are transmitted to the cross-section of liquidity-sorted portfolios, with most liquid stocks playing a very active role. Our results emphatically document that the shocks-returns relationship has reversed its sign during the recent financial crisis; the standard inverse relationship between interest rate surprises and portfolios’ returns before the crisis has turned into positive during the crisis. This finding confirms the inability of interest rate cuts to boost returns in the shortrun during the crisis, because these were perceived by market participants as a signal of a deteriorating economic outlook.
Resumo:
When Bank of England (and the Federal Reserve Board) introduced their quantitative easing (QE) operations they emphasised the effects on money and credit, but much of their empirical research on the effects of QE focuses on long-term interest rates. We use a flow of funds matrix with an independent central bank to show the implications of QE and other monetary developments, and argue that the financial crisis, the fiscal expansion and QE are likely to have constituted major exogenous shocks to money and credit in the UK which could not be digested immediately by the usual adjustment mechanisms. We present regressions of a reduced form model which considers the growth of nominal spending as determined by the growth of nominal money and other variables. These results suggest that money was not important during the Great Moderation but has had a much larger role in the period of the crisis and QE. We then use these estimates to illustrate the effects of the financial crisis and QE. We conclude that it would be useful to incorporate money and/or credit in wider macroeconometric models of the UK economy.
Resumo:
This paper examines the impact of Federal Funds rate (FFR) surprises on stock returns in the United States over the period 1989-2009, focusing on the impact of the recent financial crisis. We find that prior to the crisis, stock prices increased as a response to unexpected FFR cuts. State dependence is also identified with stocks exhibiting larger increases when interest rate easing coincided with recessions, bear stock markets, and tightening credit market conditions. However, an important structural shift took place during the financial crisis, which changed the stock market response to FFR shocks, as well as the nature of state dependence. Specifically, during the crisis period stock market participants did not react positively to unexpected FFR cuts. Our results highlight the severity of the recent financial turmoil episode and the ineffectiveness of conventional monetary policy close to the zero lower bound for nominal interest rates.
Resumo:
We develop an empirical framework that links micro-liquidity, macro-liquidity and stock prices. We provide evidence of a strong link between macro-liquidity shocks and the returns of UK stock portfolios constructed on the basis of micro-liquidity measures between 1999-2012. Specifically, macro-liquidity shocks, which are extracted on the meeting days of the Bank of England Monetary Policy Committee relative to market expectations embedded in 3-month LIBOR futures prices, are transmitted in a differential manner to the cross-section of liquidity-sorted portfolios, with liquid stocks playing the most active role. We also find that there is a significant increase in shares’ trading activity and a rather small increase in their trading cost on MPC meeting days. Finally, our results emphatically document that during the recent financial crisis the shocks-returns relationship has reversed its sign. Interest rate cuts during the crisis were perceived by market participants as a signal of deteriorating economic prospects and reinforced “flight to safety” trading.
Resumo:
Using a large panel of unquoted euro-area firms over the period 2003-11, this paper examines the impact of financial pressure on firms’ employment. The analysis finds evidence that financial pressure negatively affects firms’ employment decisions. This effect is stronger during the 2007-2009 financial crisis, especially for firms in the periphery area compared to their counterparts in the core European economies. We also find that impact of financial pressure on employment is more potent for firms classified as financially constrained and operating in periphery economies during the financial crisis.
Resumo:
Using a panel of 38 economies, over the period 2001 to 2010, we analyse the link between diversification in equity portfolios and different facets of education. We find that traditionally used measures of education play an important role in reducing equity home bias. After separating countries according to their level of financial development, we find that less developed economies tend to benefit more from an improvement in the level of education compared to their more developed counterparts. We also find that the beneficial effect of education is more pronounced during the most recent financial crisis, especially for economies with less developed financial markets.
Resumo:
Using a large panel of unquoted UK over the period 2000-09, we examine the impact of firm-specific uncertainty on corporate failures. In this context we also distinguish between firms which are likely to be more or less dependant on bank finance as well as public and non-public companies. Our results document a significant effect of uncertainty on firm survival. This link is found to be more potent during the recent financial crisis compared with tranquil periods. We also uncover significant firm-level heterogeneity since the survival chance of bank-dependent and non-public firms are most affected by changes in uncertainty, especially during the recent global financial crisis.
Resumo:
Empirical investigation of the external finance premium has been conducted on the margin between internal finance and bank borrowing or equities but little attention has been given to corporate bonds, especially for the emerging Asian market. In this paper, we hypothesize that balance sheet indicators of creditworthiness could affect the external finance premium for bonds as they do for premia in other markets. Using bond-specific and firm-specific data for China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Korea, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand during 1995-2009 we find that firms with better financial health face lower external finance premia in all countries. When we introduce firm-level heterogeneity, we show that financial variables appear to be both statistically and quantitatively more important for financially constrained firms. Finally, when we examine the effects of the 1997-98 Asian crisis and the 2007-09 global financial crisis, we find that the sensitivity of the premium is greater for constrained firms during the Asian crisis compared to other times.
Resumo:
Using a large panel of unquoted UK firms over the period 2000-09, we examine the impact of firm-specific uncertainty on corporate failures. In this context we also distinguish between firms which are likely to be more or less dependent on bank finance as well as public and non-public companies. Our results document a significant effect of uncertainty on firm survival. This link is found to be more potent during the recent financial crisis compared with tranquil periods. We also uncover significant firm-level heterogeneity since the survival chances of bank-dependent and non-public firms are most affected by changes in uncertainty, especially during the recent global financial crisis.
Resumo:
We use a panel of euro area countries to assess the determinants of long-term sovereign bond yield spreads over the period 1999.01-2010.12. We find that, unlike the period preceding the global financial crisis, European government bond yield spreads are wellexplained by macro- and fiscal fundamentals over the crisis period. We also find that the menu of macro and fiscal risks priced by markets has been significantly enriched since March 2009, including the risk of the crisis’ transmission among EMU member states, international risk and liquidity risk. Finally, we find that sovereign credit ratings are statistically significant in explaining spreads, yet compared to macro- and fiscal fundamentals their role is limited.
Resumo:
We use a dynamic multipath general-to-specific algorithm to capture structural instability in the link between euro area sovereign bond yield spreads against Germany and their underlying determinants over the period January 1999 – August 2011. We offer new evidence suggesting a significant heterogeneity across countries, both in terms of the risk factors determining spreads over time as well as in terms of the magnitude of their impact on spreads. Our findings suggest that the relationship between euro area sovereign risk and the underlying fundamentals is strongly timevarying, turning from inactive to active since the onset of the global financial crisis and further intensifying during the sovereign debt crisis. As a general rule, the set of financial and macro spreads’ determinants in the euro area is rather unstable but generally becomes richer and stronger in significance as the crisis evolves.
Resumo:
An expanding literature articulates the view that Taylor rules are helpful in predicting exchange rates. In a changing world however, Taylor rule parameters may be subject to structural instabilities, for example during the Global Financial Crisis. This paper forecasts exchange rates using such Taylor rules with Time Varying Parameters (TVP) estimated by Bayesian methods. In core out-of-sample results, we improve upon a random walk benchmark for at least half, and for as many as eight out of ten, of the currencies considered. This contrasts with a constant parameter Taylor rule model that yields a more limited improvement upon the benchmark. In further results, Purchasing Power Parity and Uncovered Interest Rate Parity TVP models beat a random walk benchmark, implying our methods have some generality in exchange rate prediction.
Resumo:
Some studies argue that the Fed reacts to financial market developments. Using data covering the period 1985:Q1 - 2008:Q4 and employing an augmented Taylor rule specification, we re-examine that conjecture. We find that evidence in favour of such a reaction is largely driven by the Fed’s behaviour during the 2007-2008 financial crisis.
Resumo:
The eight years from 2000 to 2008 saw a rapid growth in the use of securitization by UK banks. We aim to identify the reasons that contributed to this rapid growth. The time period (2000 to 2010) covered by our study is noteworthy as it covers the pre- financial crisis credit-boom, the peak of the fi nancial crisis and its aftermath. In the wake of the financial crisis, many governments, regulators and political commentators have pointed an accusing finger at the securitization market - even in the absence of a detailed statistical and economic analysis. We contribute to the extant literature by performing such an analysis on UK banks, focussing principally on whether it is the need for liquidity (i.e. the funding of their balance sheets), or the desire to engage in regulatory capital arbitrage or the need for credit risk transfer that has led to UK banks securitizing their assets. We show that securitization has been signi ficantly driven by liquidity reasons. In addition, we observe a positive link between securitization and banks credit risk. We interpret these latter findings as evidence that UK banks which engaged in securitization did so, in part, to transfer credit risk and that, in comparison to UK banks which did not use securitization, they had more credit risk to transfer in the sense that they originated lower quality loans and held lower quality assets. We show that banks which issued more asset-backed securities before the financial crisis suffered more defaults after the financial crisis.