Beyond Intermediates: The Role of Consumption and Commuting in the Construction of Local Input-Output Tables

It is a well-established fact in the literature on simulating Input-Output tables that mechanical methods for estimating intermediate trade lead to biased results where cross-hauling is underestimated and Type-I multipliers are overstated. Repeated findings to this effect have led to a primary emphasis on advocating the accurate estimation of intermediate trade flows. This paper reviews previous research and argues for a qualification of the consensus view: When simulating IO tables, construction approaches need to consider spill-over effects driven by wage and consumption flows. In particular, for the case of metropolitan economies, wage and consumption flows are important if accurate Type-II multipliers are to be obtained. This is demonstrated by constructing an interregional Input-Output table, which captures interdependencies between a city and its commuter belt, nested within the wider regional economy. In addition to identifying interdependencies caused by interregional intermediate purchases, data on subregional household incomes and commuter flows are used to identify interdependencies from wage payments and household consumption. The construction of the table is varied around a range of assumptions on intermediate trade and household consumption to capture the sensitivity of multipliers.

Mafia in the ballot box

We study the impact of organized crime on electoral competition. Assuming that the mafia is able to bring votes to the supported party in exchange of money, we show that (i) the strongest party is willing to pay the highest price to secure mafia services; (ii) the volume of electoral trade with the mafia increases with political competition and with the efficiency of the mafia. Studying in detail parliamentary elections in Sicily for the period 1946- 1992, we document the significant support given by the Sicilian Mafia to the Christian Democratic party, starting at least from the 1970s. This is consistent with our theoretical predictions, as political competition became much tighter during the 1970s and the Sicilian mafia experienced an extensive centralization process towards the end of the 1960s, which increased substantially its control of the territory. We also provide evidence that in exchange for its electoral support the mafia got economic advantages for its activities in the construction industry.