The Taylor Principle and (In-) Determinacy in a New Keynesian Model with hiring Frictions and Skill Loss

We introduce duration dependent skill decay among the unemployed into a New-Keynesian model with hiring frictions developed by Blanchard/Gali (2008). If the central bank responds only to (current, lagged or expected future) inflation and quarterly skill decay is above a threshold level, determinacy requires a coefficient on inflation smaller than one. The threshold level is plausible with little steady-state hiring and firing ("Continental European Calibration") but implausibly high in the opposite case ("American calibration"). Neither interest rate smoothing nor responding to the output gap helps to restore determinacy if skill decay exceeds the threshold level. However, a modest response to unemployment guarantees determinacy. Moreover, under indeterminacy, both an adverse sunspot shock and an adverse technology shock increase unemployment extremely persistently.

Responsibility for regional waste generation: A single region extended input-output analysis with uni-directional trade flows

The paper uses a regional input-output (IO) framework and data derived on waste generation by industry to examine regional accountability for waste generation. In addition to estimating a series of industry output-waste coefficients, the paper considers two methods for waste attribution but focuses first on one (trade endogenised linear attribution system (TELAS)) that permits a greater focus on private and public final consumption as the main exogenous driver of waste generation. Second, the paper uses a domestic technology assumption (DTA) to consider a regional ‘waste footprint’ where local consumption requirements are assumed to be met through domestic production.

The Liberal Ethics of Non-Interference and the Pareto Principle

We analyse the liberal ethics of non-interference applied to social choice. A liberal principle capturing noninterfering views of society and inspired by John Stuart Mill s conception of liberty, is examined. The principle captures the idea that society should not penalise agents after changes in their situation that do not a¤ect others. An impossibility for liberal approaches is highlighted: every social decision rule that satis es unanimity and a general principle of noninterference must be dictatorial. This raises some important issues for liberal approaches in social choice and political philosophy.