International Corporate Taxation and U.S. Multinationals’ Behavior: an Integrated Approach

Using data from the International Revenue Service, this paper explores the effcts of corporate taxation on U.S. capital invested abroad and on tax planning practices (dividend payments, income shifting, and passive investment). The econometric analysis first indicates that investment is strongly influenced by average tax rates, with a magnified impact for particularly low-tax rates implying that the attractiveness of low-tax countries is not weakened by anti-deferral rules and cross-crediting limitations. Further explorations suggest that firms report higher profit and are less likely to repatriate dividends when they are located in low-tax jurisdictions. Firms also report higher Subpart F income in countries in which they shift their profit, suggesting that cross-crediting provides an incentive to shift passive income in low-tax countries and that passive investment can be an alternative strategy to minimize taxes when active investment opportunities are lacking. Finally, the paper estimates the role of effective transfer pricing regulation on income shifting activities using the quality of host countries' law enforcement. It appears that low degrees of law enforcement are associated with higher income-shifting.

Experimental evidence of a sunk–cost paradox: a study of pricing behavior in Bertrand–Edgeworth duopoly

A well–known implication of microeconomic theory is that sunk costs should have no effect on decision making. We test this hypothesis with a human–subjects experiment. Students recruited from graduate business courses, with an average of over six years of work experience, played the role of firms in a repeated price–setting duopoly game in which both firms had identical capacity constraints and costs, including a sunk cost that varied across experimental sessions over six different values. We find, contrary to the prediction of microeconomic theory, that subjects’ pricing decisions show sizable differences across treatments. The effect of the sunk cost is non–monotonic: as it increases from low to medium levels, average prices decrease, but as it increases from medium to high levels, average prices increase. These effects are not apparent initially, but develop quickly and persist throughout the game. Cachon and Camerer’s (1996) loss avoidance is consistent with both effects, while cost–based pricing predicts only the latter effect, and is inconsistent with the former.

The system-wide impacts of the external benefits to higher education on the Scottish economy: An exploratory “micro-to-macro” approach

The private market benefits of education, i.e. the wage premia of graduates, are widely studied at the micro level, although the magnitude of their macroeconomic impact is disputed. However, there are additional benefits of education, which are less well understood but could potentially drive significant macroeconomic impacts. Following the taxonomy of McMahon (2009) we identify four different types of benefits of education. These are: private market benefits (wage premia); private non market benefits (own health, happiness, etc.); external market benefits (productivity spillovers; and external non-market benefits (crime rates, civic society, democratisation, etc.). Drawing on available microeconometric evidence we use a micro-to-macro simulation approach (Hermannsson et al, 2010) to estimate the macroeconomic impacts of external benefits of higher education. We explore four cases: technology spillovers from HEIs; productivity spillovers from more skilled workers in the labour market; reduction in property crime; and the potential overall impact of external and private non-market benefits. Our results suggest that the external economic benefits of higher education could potentially be very large. However, given the dearth of microeconomic evidence this result should be seen as tentative. Our aim is to illustrate the links from education to the wider economy in principle and encourage further research in the field.

A Theory of Wage Setting Behavior

Concerns for fairness, workers' morale and reciprocity infuence firms' wage setting policy. In this paper we formalize a theory of wage setting behavior in a simple and tractable model that explicitly considers these behavioral aspects. A worker is assumed to have reference-dependent preferences and displays loss aversion when evaluating the fairness of a wage contract. The theory establishes a wage-effort relationship that captures the worker's reference-dependent reciprocity, which in turn in uences the firm's optimal wage policy. The paper makes two key contributions: it identifies loss aversion as an explanation for a worker's asymmetric reciprocity; and it provides realistic and generalized microfoundation for downward wage rigidity. We further illustrate the implications of our theory for both wage setting and hiring behavior. Downward wage rigidity generates several implications for the outcome of the initial employment contract. The worker's reference wage, his extent of negative reciprocity and the firms expectations are key drivers of the propositions derived.