On Public Inefficiencies in a Mixed Duopoly

The aim of this paper is to investigate the welfare effect of a change in the public firms objective function in oligopoly when the government takes into account the distortionary effect of rising funds by taxation (shadow cost of public funds). We analyze the impact of a shift from welfare- to profit-maximizing behaviour of the public firm on the timing of competition by endogenizing the determination of simultaneous (Nash-Cournot) versus sequential (Stackelberg) games using the game with observable delay proposed by Hamilton and Slutsky (1990). Differently from previous work that assumed the timing of competition, we show that, absent efficiency gains, instructing the public firm to play as a private one never increases welfare. Moreover, even when large efficiency gains result from the shift in public firm's objective, an inefficient public firm that maximizes welfare may be preferred.

Poor and Sick: Estimating the relationship between Household Income and Health

This study evaluates the effect of the individual‘s household income on their health at the later stages of working life. A structural equation model is utilised in order to derive a composite and continuous index of the latent health status from qualitative health status indicators. The endogenous relationship between health status and household income status is taken into account by using IV estimators. The findings reveal a significant effect of individual household income on health before and after endogeneity is taken into account and after a host of other factors which is known to influence health, including hereditary factors and the individual‘s locus of control. Importantly, it is also shown that the childhood socioeconomic position of the individual has long lasting effects on health as it appears to play a significant role in determining health during the later stages of working life.