The Good, the Bad and the Populist: A Model of Political Agency with Emotional Voters

This paper attempts to extend existing models of political agency to an environment in which voting may be divided between informed and instrumental, informed and ‘expressive’ (Brennan and Lomasky (1993)) and uninformed due to ‘rational irrationality’ (Caplan (2007)). It constructs a model where politicians may be good, bad or populist. Populists are more willing than good politicians to pander to voters who may choose inferior policies in a large-group electoral setting because their vote is insignificant compared with those that voters would choose were their vote decisive in determining the electoral outcome. Bad politicians would ideally like to extract tax revenue for their own ends. Initially we assume the existence of only good and populist politicians. The paper investigates the incentives for good politicians to pool with or separate from populists and focuses on three key issues – (1) how far the majority of voter’s preferences are from those held by the better informed incumbent politician (2) the extent to which the population exhibits rational irrationality and expressiveness (jointly labelled as emotional) and (3) the cost involved in persuading uninformed voters to change their views in terms of composing messages and spreading them. This paper goes on to consider how the inclusion of bad politicians may affect the behaviour of good politicians and suggests that a small amount of potential corruption may be socially useful. It is also argued that where bad politicians have an incentive to mimic the behaviour of good and populist politicians, the latter types of politician may have an incentive to separate from bad politicians by investing in costly public education signals. The paper also discusses the implications of the model for whether fiscal restraints should be soft or hard.

The EMU sovereign-debt crisis: Fundamentals, expectations and contagion

We offer a detailed empirical investigation of the European sovereign debt crisis based on the theoretical model by Arghyrou and Tsoukalas (2010). We find evidence of a marked shift in market pricing behaviour from a ‘convergence-trade’ model before August 2007 to one driven by macro-fundamentals and international risk thereafter. The majority of EMU countries have experienced contagion from Greece. There is no evidence of significant speculation effects originating from CDS markets. Finally, the escalation of the Greek debt crisis since November 2009 is confirmed as the result of an unfavourable shift in countryspecific market expectations. Our findings highlight the necessity of structural, competitiveness-inducing reforms in periphery EMU countries and institutional reforms at the EMU level enhancing intra-EMU economic monitoring and policy co-ordination.

The EMU sovereign-debt crisis: fundamentals, expectations and contagion

In a research project conducted while visiting the DG-ECFIN in June 2010, we provided a detailed empirical investigation of the EMU sovereign-debt crisis up to February 2010.

Contagious Illiquidity I: Contagion through Time

This paper is an investigation into the dynamics of asset markets with adverse selection a la Akerlof (1970). The particular question asked is: can market failure at some later date precipitate market failure at an earlier date? The answer is yes: there can be "contagious illiquidity" from the future back to the present. The mechanism works as follows. If the market is expected to break down in the future, then agents holding assets they know to be lemons (assets with low returns) will be forced to hold them for longer - they cannot quickly resell them. As a result, the effective difference in payoff between a lemon and a good asset is greater. But it is known from the static Akerlof model that the greater the payoff differential between lemons and non-lemons, the more likely is the market to break down. Hence market failure in the future is more likely to lead to market failure today. Conversely, if the market is not anticipated to break down in the future, assets can be readily sold and hence an agent discovering that his or her asset is a lemon can quickly jettison it. In effect, there is little difference in payoff between a lemon and a good asset. The logic of the static Akerlof model then runs the other way: the small payoff differential is unlikely to lead to market breakdown today. The conclusion of the paper is that the nature of today's market - liquid or illiquid - hinges critically on the nature of tomorrow's market, which in turn depends on the next day's, and so on. The tail wags the dog.